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Abstract
The issue of representation remains a key area of exploration for critical theory and 
philosophy during the 20^ century. Broadly speaking, the project, in part, of post- 
structural and Postmodern theorists has been to explore representation and the way in 
which our altered stance towards it has reconfigured the scope of our understanding of 
the social, political, economic and artistic worlds. Specifically, Jean Baudrillard and 
Gilles Deleuze most radically investigate what exactly such a challenge to our 
understanding of the world means through their concepts of simulation, which depart 
from its source in Plato’s theory of forms. This thesis employs the Wachowskis’s 
blockbuster films The Matrix trilogy as examples through which to apply Baudrillard’s 
and Deleuze’s concepts of simulation so as to probe the limits of the meaning of 
representation as it applies to contemporary film and critical theory.
This thesis looks at both the genealogy as well as the contemporary uses of 
simulation in the works of Baudrillard and Deleuze, while also expanding this analysis to 
include other relevant concepts in both theorists’ vocabulary such as symbolic exchange, 
territoriality, and becoming. The works of Baudrillard and Deleuze are contrasted at 
various points throughout the thesis in their application to The Matrix trilogy so as to 
show not only the particularly relevant nuances of the concepts of both theorists, but also 
in order to expand the analysis of the Wachowskis’s films so as to interrogate the value of 
each theory when put into practice in a contemporary, cultural film. The character 
analysis of The Matrix trilogy specifically focuses on Neo and Agent Smith, both of 
whom stand in a problematic relationship to the mechanics of representation; the former’s 
identity is unstable as it operates within and from without the matrix program, while the 
latter’s identity is, at best, indeterminate as it is self-propelled and chaotically multiplies
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IV
through viral replication. Neo is analyzed with regards to the key references made by 
The Matrix trilogy to Baudrillard’s work in such scenes as the one in which Simulacra 
and Simulation appears as a prop in Neo’s apartment, as well as his discussion with 
Morpheus that makes direct reference to the Borges fable. Baudrillard’s own dismissal of 
the film as accurately responding to his theories is also considered. This analysis is 
developed further by contrasting Baudrillard’s and Deleuze’s versions o f simulation 
through Brian Massumi’s characterization of the latter’s privileged space of resistance. 
Here, Baudrillard’s orders of simulation and symbolic exchange are juxtaposed with 
Deleuze’s simulation and becoming in an exploration of the figure of Agent Smith and 
the extent to which either theory can provide resistance to hegemonic systems in post- 
representational contexts.
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Introduction: Entering the Matrix
With its stunning box office success, recent cult-like following and the production 
of two subsequent sequels, the Wachowski brothers’ The Matrix trilogy has been the 
subject of growing academic attention in terms of its philosophical, cultural, and religious 
characteristics. Discussion of simulation and virtual reality is one of the more prominent 
topics critiqued in the film, which has translated into a variety of publications that 
address the influence of Jean Baudrillard’s theory of simulation in framing the conceptual 
fi-amework of the trilogy. Such application of Baudrillard’s theories to the films is to be 
expected given that his work on simulation is one of the more developed as well as, 
perhaps, one of the most familiar forms of such theorization in Western thought. The 
trilogy also textually supports such a connection, at least in part, in terms of making 
apparent that the Wachowskis were influenced by Baudrillard’s work and, subsequently, 
intended to present their vision of simulation in the context o f a futuristic, dystopian 
world. Evidence of the Wachowskis intention to present some form of a Baudrillardian 
world comes by way of, but is not limited to, the famous example of their inclusion of 
Baudrillard’s text on simulation as a prop in Neo’s apartment.
The attention placed on Baudrillard is, thus, understandable in that the chief issue 
presented by the trilogy is that of simulation, and the questioning of what has become for 
many critics the postmodern problem of the blurring of the line between the real and the 
illusory. Despite the numerous publications that apply a Baudrillardian version of 
simulation to the film in identifying the important aspects of hyperreality, implosion, and 
the distinction between appearance/reality, this area of criticism is still without a 
sustained and substantial analysis of the trilogy through Baudrillard’s work. The main
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problem with regards to existing scholarship, as I will discuss in chapter one, is that it 
relies upon misinformed readings o f Baudrillard’s concept o f simulation in that it is, for 
the most part, incorrectly conflated with the postmodern so as to be in some way 
emblematic of the postmodern condition of contemporary society. I use Paul Hegarty’s 
insightful analysis of how Baudrillard is all too often read in a superficial way so as to 
analyze science-fiction writer Joe Haldeman’s rather bold and provocative but entirely 
unsubstantiated dismissal o f graduate students working on The Matrix trilogy through 
Baudrillard’s philosophy of simulation. This analysis is extended to include the articles 
written by Dino Felluga and Andrew Gordon, who, although they do not dismiss the 
relevancy of Baudrillard, nevertheless similarly conflate the problem of simulation with 
that of a postmodern condition. In showing how the above mentioned readings are 
flawed in their initial understanding of Baudrillard as well as their application of 
Baudrillard’s concepts to the films, I explicate the concept of simulation and its 
manifestation in the three orders o f simulacra through Gary Genosko’s writings on the 
subject as well as, already mentioned, the work of Hegarty, both of whom provide 
nuanced analyses of the concept while also showing the importance of not reducing the 
problem of simulation to some type of larger effect of postmodernism. In chapter one, I 
qlso investigate the rather interesting, perhaps not surprising, position that Baudrillard 
himself takes in an interview in response to questions about the film trilogy. Although 
discussing the way in which the Wachowskis contacted and privately screened the 
sequels for him, Baudrillard distances himself from The Matrix trilogy by claiming that it 
confuses the problematic of simulation with its older treatment in Platonic discourse in 
maintaining a lucid distinction between the real and illusory.
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Overall, chapter one is intended to be an explication of Baudrillard’s concept of 
simulation and the key aspects that contribute to the understanding of it, such as 
implosion, repetition, representation, and the semi otic attributes of the precession of 
simulacra. I use this explication in order to interrogate the viability of the concept’s 
applicability to the film trilogy, firstly, in the work already published in the area and, 
secondly, through my own analysis o f particular scenes that, I believe, have a great 
relative importance within the trilogy. Two such scenes that I discuss are the ones 
involving the simulated nature of Neo’s dual role of programmer/hacker in the matrix, 
which points in the direction of what William Bogart calls ‘simveillence’, as well as his 
encounter with the architect figure where Neo chooses his actions and decisions thereby 
providing a strong counter-example to reading the trilogy as exemplary of Baudrillard’s 
simulation. While chapter one does not reach a totalizing standpoint with regards to 
whether or not Baudrillard’s concept of simulation applies to the trilogy, it is intended to 
show a balanced one that both considers the strong and nuanced arguments as well as the 
counter-arguments. Chapter one can then be read as a mapping out of the possibilities 
and limitations of engaging a contemporary cultural text through Baudrillard’s concept of 
simulation.
Chapter two departs from the standpoint that The Matrix trilogy operates within 
the scope of contemporary theorizations of the concept of simulation, but in so doing it 
does not lend itself to a single consolidated version of the simulacrum, such as 
Baudrillard’s. Instead, as I intend to show in chapter two, the films engage the different 
theoretical stances of both Baudrillard and Gilles Deleuze. Consequently, I present an 
explication of Deleuze’s form of simulation in the second chapter through a distinction to
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Baudrillard’s in the way in which both re-work the Platonic model of Idea and copy. In 
this distinction the importance is underlined of how both theorists move away from the 
Platonic model of representation and diverge along immanent and transcendent 
conceptions of the simulacra. This preliminary distinction will in a large part inform my 
application of Deleuze’s simulacrum to The Matrix trilogy so as to show the relevance of 
how repetition works through maximal difference. The basis o f repetition working 
through maximal difference can be seen in stark contrast to Baudrillard for whom the 
reign of the code in third order simulation predetermines signification in advance of 
actual events. Thus, the Deleuzian simulacrum that is continuously undergoing a process 
of becoming-other in self-differentiation can be effectively distinguished from the 
Baudrillardian simulacrum that is based on minimal differentiation -  such minimal 
difference occurring in the form of combinatorial modulation at the level of the code. In 
this way, then, simulacra in Deleuze are dislodged from a framework of representation by 
virtue of their self-sufficient capacity in the production of new meaning in form as well 
as content, whereas simulacra in Baudrillard already find the possibility of representation 
imploded in that productions of new meaning are impossible due to the collapse of any 
meaningful distinction, such as the virtual and actual, or the copy and original.
Chapter two, thus, seeks to contribute to scholarship on simulation by way of 
applying the Deleuzian form of it to The Matrix trilogy, which has not yet been done. 
Before applying Deleuze’s simulacrum to the trilogy, I explore Brain Massumi’s claim 
that Deleuze’s form of simulation, unlike the Baudrillardian one, offers the possibility o f 
a veritable space of resistance. I am at odds with this particular reading not because of 
the space of resistance it offers to the Deleuzian simulacrum, but because in order to do
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so Massumi positions the latter in contra-distinction to Baudrillard. Such a distinction, I 
believe, is relatively unnecessary in that the Deleuzian simulacrum operates on a 
principle of an immanent production of meaning, which, moreover, is self-sufficient in its 
becoming-for-it-self. Having said this, Massumi’s position presents a limited perspective 
of the Baudrillardian simulacrum by way of omitting the role of symbolic exchange.
Here I refer to Genosko’s and Hegarty’s explications o f symbolic exchange as it serves, 
importantly, the role of counter-point to simulation in having the capacity to re-introduce 
distinction into societies of simulation and, thus, reverse and interrupt the workings of the 
implosion of meaning. Also, important to a consideration of symbolic exchange and how 
it applies to cultural texts is an examination of its origins in the work of Marcel Mauss 
and George Bataille.
After a consideration of symbolic exchange, I explore the importance of the ideas 
of repetition, difference production, (non-) identity construction, Nietzschean eternal 
recurrence, and the concept of becoming. I present an analysis of how the image 
proliferation of Neo in the architect scene, which I initially discuss in chapter one, seems 
to present a form Deleuzian simulation but, in the end, differs from it by presenting the 
possible and not the virtual. It is here that I explore the relevant distinctions made by 
Constantine V. Boundas between the virtual and the potential and the possible and how 
these aspects influence the architect scene. It is in light of such distinctions that I refer 
back to Baudrillard by considering his criticism of immanent philosophies in which he 
argues that they are complicit in what he sees as a referential tautology. Immanent 
concepts, for Baudrillard, cannot by any means produce a self-sufficiency of productions 
of meaning and are, instead, continuously trapped, as it were, within the imploded space
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of simulation that precludes a critical space of distance required to make such claims. 
Here I consider the Deleuzian response to Baudrillard through Boundas’s analysis of the 
virtual as well as Claire Colebrook’s analysis of the way in which the virtual and actual 
distinction differs in Deleuze’s and Baudrillard’s accounting of the concept of simulation.
In the conclusion to chapter two I specifically take note of how the Deleuzian 
simulacrum applies to the viral replication of the Agent Smith figure. The manifold 
Smith copies, I argue, are the most lucid example of Deleuzian simulation in The Matrix 
trilogy by virtue of their capacity to stand on their own as distinct and self-differentiating 
simulacra. The difference production of each Smith is clearly shown in the battle scenes 
where hundreds of Smiths swarm Neo from different angles, using a variety o f tactics, 
showing different responses, etc. It is here that I see Baudrillard’s third order simulation, 
perhaps, impossibly attempting to account for the manifold Smiths. Thus, in conclusion 
to chapter two I refer back to Baudrillard by briefly looking at the fractal order of 
simulation and symbolic exchange as proposing alternative ways of reading the Smith 
figure and The Matrix trilogy in general.
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Chapter One: Closed Circuit o f  the Simulacrum
One throwaway reference that will probably be fueling easy masters’ 
theses for a decade or so is the fact that Neo has his stash of illicit programs 
hidden in a hoHowed-out book that is a basic postmodern text, Simulacra and 
Simulation, by Jean Baudrillard. Like the movie itself, postmodernism is a 
stimulating grab-bag of notions, not necessarily related to one another in any 
outside context. From the momentary flash of the book title, any half-awake 
graduate student can ride the white rabbit o f postmodernism across the junkyard 
of the film’s references to whatever conclusion seems most acceptable to his or 
her thesis committee.
That may be the best and final joke in a movie that is, in its deadpan 
seriousness, a funny sci-fi romp from beginning to end. (Haldeman 179)
The above quoted text is the conclusion of Joe Haldeman’s article “The Matrix as Sci-fi”.
I decided to use Haldeman’s conclusion as the epigraph to the first chapter of my thesis
since it is by far the most provocative statement made about Baudrillard and The Matrix
that I have found during my research on the topic. What makes it provocative for me is
the fact that he speaks directly to the context in which I am writing my thesis; I am a
master’s student writing my thesis on the topic o f the influence of Baudrillard’s concept
of the simulacrum on The Matrix trilogy. I have to admit that I was disappointed after
reading Haldeman’s article since his bold claims regarding Baudrillard and the
postmodern are only ever discussed during the quoted conclusion. The rest of the article
is devoted to the separation and definition of what Haldeman interprets as the binary
terms Sci-Fi and Science Fiction. He has this to say about the distinction: unlike Sci-fi
that stresses “action, thrills, a strong plot” and in the case of films “visual novelty,
particularly mind-blowing special effects”. Science Fiction, somewhat vaguely, focuses
on “good ideas and good writing” (174-5).' The Matrix is positioned in the Sci-fi genre
’ Haldeman Anther supports this distinction by claiming the following contrast: “The difference between 
science fiction and sci-fi is as basic as the difference between poetry and greeting verse. Both are similar in
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by Haldeman, who sees it as representative of the overly-commercialized genre that 
focuses on entertainment value and not intellectualism (good ideas and good writing).
And thus in his conclusion Haldeman will lump The Matrix together with postmodernism 
and the work of Baudrillard for which he has an evident distaste. Again, I find it 
disappointing that Haldeman does not substantiate his dismissal of graduate students who 
pursue the relationship between The Matrix and Baudrillard’s work because even if such 
an analysis did not translate into a worthwhile academic project, it would, I believe, at 
least prove quite an engaging read for students in my position. I have to go on the 
assumption that Haldeman does not substantiate his claims as a result of one or a 
combination of the following points: 1) Haldeman has insufficient knowledge in the areas 
of postmodernism and Baudrillard for him to provide a critical analysis o f their relation to 
The Matrix and graduate theses; 2) Haldeman believes that his dismissal o f the 
postmodern and Baudrillard is so accurate and evident that it does not require further 
explanation; 3) his prejudice against such areas of inquiry is so strong that he would 
prefer not talking about them at any great length. Whatever (non) reasons exist behind 
Haldeman’s decision to present his critique in such a superficial way, it is worthwhile 
discussing, I believe, since associations between Baudrillard and the postmodern are 
commonplace in cultural studies scholarship, as will become clear throughout the chapter 
as I review various critics who engage The Matrix through a Baudrillardian perspective. 
Having said this, I believe there is not much of a case to be made for Baudrillard being a 
postmodernist, or that he in some way trumpets the cause of postmodemity in his analysis 
of societies of simulation (hyperreality). A relevant question about Baudrillard, I believe,
appearance but different in function; in both comparisons, the commercial manifestation trumps its 
intellectual brother̂ ’ (172-3).
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is one that examines his (dis)connection with/to postmodernism and although I do not 
intend to engage, for example, in Haldeman’s quick dismissal o f postmodernism, I will 
clarify what I see as a misinformed reading of the direct connection between Baudrillard 
and postmodernism. After examining this (dis)connection, I plan to look at the 
appearance of the text Simulacra and Simulation in The Matrix. Is it just another element 
among the film’s junkyard of references as Haldeman would like to maintain? I intend to 
show that although the text’s appearance in the film does not constitute a pivotal point of 
analysis on its own, it is among a number of other references made to Baudrillard that 
illustrates some sort of connection between The Matrix and Baudrillard’s work. What 
exactly is this connection between The Matrix and Baudrillard? I intend to investigate 
this question, in part, by analyzing the appearance of Baudrillard’s text in the film since it 
marks a point fi'om which critics launch their analyses of The Matrix and Baudrillard. 
Lastly, I will let this chapter stand on its own in response to whether or not it is 
worthwhile for graduate students to pursue postmodernism’s white rabbit “across the 
junkyard of the film’s references to whatever conclusion seems most acceptable to his or 
her thesis committee” (179).
The issue regarding Baudrillard’s connection to the postmodern is a complex one, 
but one that already has been the focus of considerable debate since his reception in 
North America. Mike Gane aptly summarizes the critical interest in Baudrillard’s work: 
“The interest in postmodernism has certainly served Baudrillard for there is enormous 
curiosity in establishing just what Baudrillard’s position is if it is not postmodern” (Gane 
iix). Gane also explains that leading critics such as Douglas Kellner and Fredric 
Jameson, among others, were in various ways associating Baudrillard with
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
10
postmodernism during the 1980’s. Before I return to a discussion of Kellner and 
Jameson, I will quote Paul Hegarty who, I believe, addresses quite well the relationship 
between Baudrillard and postmodernism in his book Jean Baudrillard: Live Theory. In 
addition to making clear that Baudrillard himself refuses any association of his work to 
that of the postmodern, he lists a series o f points clarifying the misconception of 
Baudrillard as the herald of postmodernism;
Why, then, is he almost universally held to be the leader of postmodernism? The 
answer lies in superficiality; first, in the rise o f the superficial, the apparent, in 
recent history; second, Baudrillard’s interest in simulation, the virtual and the 
fractal suggests he is somehow an apologist for this condition; third, superficial 
readings have highlighted some ideas in isolation, and have created a presumption 
that what he writes, because it is free o f recognizable ideological critique, is 
uncritical of what it sees. (Hegarty 4)
Hegarty here argues that superficial readings of Baudrillard’s work are largely 
responsible for the presumptions of critics that Baudrillard is a postmodernist.^ Hegarty’s 
argument applies well to Haldeman’s above quoted conclusion. Haldeman dismisses the 
relevance and applicability of Baudrillard’s theory o f simulation to The Matrix based on 
his presumption that, firstly, postmodernism only ever leads to ambivalent and/or 
irrelevant conclusions since “any half-awake graduate student can ride the white rabbit of 
postmodernism across the junkyard of the film’s references to whatever conclusion seems
■ Hegarty expands liis analysis of Baudrillard and postmodernism in importantly outlining how 
Baudrillard’s disinterest in postmodernism is the result of the concept itself being empty and, thus, devoid 
of a place of critique and critical distance (4). Hegarty continues the analysis with the following points: 
“Very occasionally, he seems to bring his own theory within postmodernism, writing for example, on the 
postmodern as ‘surface’, as simulation. Tliis can be seen countered when he claims that tlie postmodern 
itself is simulation, and therefore falls within or beneath his own tlieory, rather than his theory being a 
manifestation of it (except insofar as everything in a simulated world is simulated. . .) ” (5).
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most acceptable[.. (Haldeman 179). Secondly, Haldeman will automatically align 
Baudrillard with the superficiality o f postmodernism: “a basic postmodern text.
Simulacra and Simulation, by Jean Baudrillard” (179). It is here that the third way of 
reading Baudrillard superficially in Hegarty’s argument applies to Haldeman’s dismissal 
of Baudrillard and The Matrix, which identifies critics that presume Baudrillard’s work is 
uncritical of what it analyses as a result of being devoid of a recognizable form of 
ideological critique. Baudrillard is anything but uncritical of societies of simulation. His 
concept of symbolic exchange, which I will explicate in chapter two, is directly 
connected as well as oppositional to simulation. Symbolic exchange, in short, is an 
essentially historic and aeconomic dimension, derived from anthro-sociological sources, 
that is eminently antagonistic to simulated practices. Unlike Haldeman’s unreferenced 
and unsupported dismissal of Baudrillard, Hegarty’s argument regarding superficial 
readings of Baudrillard will become more evident in my discussion of Dino Felluga’s and 
Andrew Gordon’s description of The Matrix and its connection to Baudrillard. Their 
readings involve an isolation of the term simulation from the context of Baudrillard’s 
work in the pursuit of either proving or disproving its relevance to the film.
Kellner’s reception of Baudrillard, at points, also falls into Hegarty’s third 
category of types of misunderstandings with regards to Baudrillard’s position. The 
simulation thesis, for Kellner, fails in approaching any sort of radicalism due to what he 
terms as ''semiological idealism ” (Kellner 62) that not only excludes a theorization of 
subjectivity (human agency) and that of mediation (intervention to politics, economics, 
etc.), but also reflects the status quo as an apolitical theory both complicit with the 
hegemony of the Right and, secretly, with “aristocratic conservatism” (215).
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Nevertheless, Kellner’s repositioned stance on Baudrillard is, perhaps, most revealing as 
Gane points out that he “later altered the thesis, admitting that in reality Baudrillard’s 
writings were generally extremely hostile to postmodernism” even though he originally 
claimed in Baudrillard (1989) that he was “a dangerous writer whose position needs to be 
entirely rejected” (Gane ix).
Unlike Kellner’s oppositional critique of Baudrillard, Jameson, instead, borrows 
aspects of Baudrillard’s theory in developing his own vision of the postmodern condition. 
One of the primary ways in which the overlap in both theories plays out is in the function 
that reification plays in developing perspectives on everyday cultural practices. Gary 
Genosko points out the importance of reification and its Marxist lineage in the work of 
Jameson and Baudrillard: “Both Jameson and Baudrillard agree that reification, the 
concept developed by Hungarian Marxist theorist Georg Lukacs in his important book 
History and Class Consciousness (1971) on the basis of Marx’s analysis of commodity 
relations, specifically commodity fetishism, is indispensable for an understanding of the 
postmodern condition (Genosko, Masters o f Implosion 113). The problematic posed by 
post-industrial culture, for Baudrillard and Jameson, is that of a new form of cultural 
space in which information practices as well as representational methods no longer serve 
as objective points of view from which to analyze culture, economics and politics, but 
rather serve alongside consumer practices as commodities themselves. As Genosko 
explains, it is a historical mutation of value in successive phases through which Jameson 
arrives at his analysis that cultural practices themselves become “direct expressions of 
economic activity” in “the hyperspace of multinational capital in a late form” (111), 
which is to say that economic and political activity becomes indistinguishable from
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consumer practices. These successive phases, the orders of simulacra, also mark an 
overlap between the two theorists: “Jameson’s debts to Baudrillard will be obvious to 
anyone who recalls my overview of the orders o f simulacra. The mutations of the law of 
value from the natural, through the market, to the structural, is paralleled by the transition 
from the dominant forms of the counterfeit, production and simulation” (112). In general 
then, an increasing degree of reification becomes apparent with each successive stage of 
simulacra as signification (meaning/value) becomes progressively more absorbed by 
simulation until the third order of simulacra, that of simulation, when they become utterly 
inseparable from the reign of the code. I will return to Baudrillard’s orders of simulacra 
later in the chapter in order to provide an explication of his theory before applying it to 
examples from The Matrix. Both Kellner’s and Jameson’s perspectives on Baudrillard 
confirm, as Gane pointed out, that there is substantial curiosity in determining the way in 
which (if at all) Baudrillard is associated with postmodernism, and, furthermore, clarify 
that such a connection is multi-faceted and complex, unlike Haldeman’s superficial claim 
that Simulacra and Simulation constitutes a seminal postmodern text that in turn would 
unfairly aim to make Baudrillard a high priest of the postmodern. Still, a simple and 
usually uncritical association between Baudrillard and the postmodern persists in current 
scholarship as will become evident in authors who take a stance on The Matrix.
Baudrillard’s text. Simulacra and Simulation, appears in an early scene in The 
Matrix. A number of critics have identified its inclusion in The Matrix in order to further 
discuss the implications of Baudrillard’s thoughts on simulation in the film, or, vice 
versa, in that by identifying Baudrillard’s text in the film they aim to criticize the role of 
postmodemity within the film, contemporary culture, and/or its application to virtual
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reality. Although none of the critics use this example as dismissively -  simply a 
“throwaway reference”  ̂-  as Haldeman, it is, nevertheless, always used similarly as a 
spring board to discussing something other than Baudrillard, again, for example 
postmodemity. In a pre-written discussion on the film entitled ''The Matrix: Paradigm of 
Postmodernism or Intellectual Poseur?”, Dino Felluga and Andrew Gordon take 
contrasting stances on The Matrix, much as the title suggests, about its intellectual 
(in)validity. Both authors begin their essays with the example of the hollowed-out copy 
of Baudrillard’s text.  ̂ Felluga’s deployment of this example leads to a discussion of the 
postmodern condition o f contemporary society as well as an inaccurate explication o f 
Baudrillard’s theories. The connection between Baudrillard and postmodernism becomes 
an implicit association in his essay since Baudrillard’s thought contributes to an 
understanding of our current society, and since current society, according to him, “has, 
for better or worse, been given the name ‘postmodern’” (Felluga 71). From this implicit 
connection follows a brief description of postmodernism, according to Felluga, that is 
defined through the conditions of language, media culture, exchange value, 
industrialization and urbanization. However, with the exception of leaning on Marx’s 
theory of exchange value, only the vague term “postmodernists” is used to contextualize 
the above conditions in the work of, presumably, postmodern critics. This leads Felluga
 ̂Even though Haldeman would dismiss its appearance as a “throwaway reference” the text does have an 
important function in terms of plot and character development. It foreshadows and builds upon Neo’s 
suspicions that, as Morpheus will later explain in a conversation, “You’ve felt it yoiu whole life, felt that 
something is wrong with the world” (Wachowski 300). The problem with the world as Morpheus poses it 
will become central to the plot of The Matrix as Neo pursues the truth of the matrix program, distinguishing 
between the appearance and reality of the world in which he lives. Secondly, the computer disk that Neo 
takes out of the hollowed-out version of Simulacra and Simulation that he sells to Choi, presumably one of 
his regular clients, develops Neo’s character into that of a hacker and distributor of contraband software. 
This will become a significant aspect of his character during the scene in which he is interrogated by Agent 
Smith, which I will return to later in an analysis of the scene’s simulated properties.
Andrew Gordon points out that Keanu Reeves was given the homework assignment of reading Simulacra 
and Simulation, as well as Kevin Kelly’s Out o f  Control: The New Biology o f  Machines, Social Systems 
and the Economic World (Gordon 86).
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to making the following claim: “Because o f these postmodern ‘conditions’, Baudrillard 
posits that we have lost all sense of ‘reality’. ‘Simulacra’ precede our every access to the 
‘real’ and thus define our real for us, hence Baudrillard’s phrase, the “precession of 
simulacra” (75). Here Hegarty’s critique of the superficial connection between 
Baudrillard and postmodernism applies. It is through Felluga’s highlighting of the term 
of simulation in isolation from the rest o f Baudrillard’s work, especially from the concept 
of symbolic exchange, that lends itself to the implicitly direct connection Felluga claims 
exists between Baudrillard’s version of simulation and that of postmodernism.
The key example Felluga will draw on to illustrate the connection between 
Baudrillard and the film is the Borges tale, taken from the text Simulacra and Simulation. 
Felluga points out that the line, “The desert o f the real itself”, from Baudrillard’s 
description of the tale is quoted by Morpheus during his explanation to Neo of the 
distinction between the cyber-matrix and the real world. This indicates for Felluga the 
Wachowskis’ intentional use of Baudrillard’s concept of simulation in The Matrix.^ It is 
however inconsistent with third order simulacra as a form of simulation that precedes all 
meaning. The scene is set in what Morpheus’s crew refers to as the construct, which is a 
program that copies the software of the matrix and allows the crew to perform a variety 
of operations; the construct is shown: in the jiu-jitsu scene that teaches Neo that he can 
break some of the rules o f the matrix; the woman in the red dress scene that teaches Neo 
that agents can assume the bodies of any un-plugged person in the matrix; and also in the 
scene where Neo and Trinity pick out weapons for the rescue of Morpheus. In the
 ̂Interestingly, Gordon expands on Felluga’s description of the inclusion of Borges’ tale in the film, “In a 
line from the screenplay draft, which was cut from the film, Morpheus even tells Neo, ‘You have been 
living inside Baudiillaid’s vision, inside the map, not the territory’ [Matrix Unfolded. 
ww.suspcnsiouofilisbclicfcnin/matn.'vlbo.hlmir (Gordon 86).
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particular scene that Felluga refers to, the construct is used by Morpheus to represent the 
dystopian world of 2199 that is scorched following the human-machine nuclear war, 
which in turn is used to show Neo the distinction between this real world and that of the 
illusory one within the cybernetic matrix that closely approximates our current world -  
set, however, in 1999, the year in which the film was produced. This example leads to 
Felluga’s following conclusion about simulation, based on Borges’ tale: “According to 
Baudrillard, what happened in postmodern culture is, to some extent, the reverse: our 
society has become so reliant on models and maps that we have lost all contact with the 
real world that preceded the map. Reality itself has begun merely to imitate the model, 
which now precedes and determines the real world” (72). The deployment of the Borges 
tale and its application to the construct program is inconsistent with Felluga’s conclusion, 
despite its accuracy, regarding the third order of simulacra. The key problematic is that 
the Borges tale like that of the construct program does not illustrate Baudrillard’s version 
of simulation; instead they deal with lower levels of simulacra, the counterfeit and/or the 
industrial, where all meaning has not yet been completely absorbed and preceded by 
simulation or the model. Hegarty explains the Borges tale and its complicity with 
representational devices:
The empire stands as a natural sign for the territory, implying identity with the 
latter by virtue of being an Empire, rather than nation or state. The development 
of maps suggests the counterfeit -  the possibility of making a copy as good as the 
‘real’ sign (the cartographers counterfeiting the development of the Empire itself 
by the Military, for example). The drive to total accuracy suggests that truth is 
possible, and can be produced. (Hegarty 58-9)
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The same analysis can be equally applied to the example of the constmct, since both 
examples not only retain, but strengthen the distinction between the real world and that of 
appearance, or that which is simulated. Morpheus uses the construct program as a copy 
through which to faithfully render a representation of the dystopic real world of 2199. 
Thus, the accuracy with which Morpheus represents the real world to Neo shows, like the 
Borges tale, the possibility of truth and its production. Because the construct scene is 
either feigning the truth (first order simulacra) or faithfully representing it (second order 
simulacra), it is for this reason that it is incompatible with simulation (third order 
simulacra). In contrast to the strategies of counterfeiting or reproduction, simulation 
anticipates the unfolding of events and is thus always already transcendent, which makes 
every action, gesture, etc. issue from a model -  as Baudrillard would say, it is neither real 
or unreal. In short, the question of a real or an original, like a distinction between an 
authentic and fake, has no space in which to occur within simulation (unless, of course, it 
is a simulacrum of a simulacrum) since everything is always already programmed and 
accounted for in advance of it occurring.
In part two of their pre-written discussion about The Matrix, Gordon provides his 
rebuttal to Felluga’s article. Gordon’s primary concern in the article is to discern whether 
or not the Wachowski brothers created a film that was equal to their artistic intentions, 
one which combined elements of a good action movie with substantial intellectual 
content.^ His final conclusion makes the claim that the Wachowskis failed in creating a 
film with a good mixture of intellectual and action content: “although The Matrix
” Felluga bases this analysis on a interview published in Ûiq American Cinematographer: “Our main goal 
with The Matrix was to make an intellectual action movie. We like action movies, guns and kung hi. but 
we’re tired of assembly-line action movies that are devoid of any intellectual content. We were determined 
to put as many ideas into the movie as we could” (Felluga 86).
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entertains and gives us plenty to think about, especially its potent and paranoid central 
metaphor about the falsity of ‘reality’, I would have to term it a flawed attempt at an 
‘intellectual action film,’ in which spectacle sometimes overrides or contradicts the ideas 
it proposes” (Gordon 101). While quite accurately, I believe, insisting that Baudrillard’s 
ideas are just one layer among the film’s intertextuality^, Gordon emphasizes how the 
Wachowski brothers misappropriate Baudrillard; “when a film alludes to a theorist whom 
it apparently misunderstands or intentionally simplifies, it loses some of its intellectual 
cachet” (100). His reasoning is two-fold; 1) unlike Baudrillard’s pessimism regarding the 
hopelessness of challenging hyperreality, The Matrix “offers a solution to the problem of 
simulation” (88); and 2) the film never presents a consolidated or total vision of 
simulation: “There are two worlds in the film -  the dream world of the Matrix, which is a 
computer-simulated version of 1999, and the real world of the postapocalyptic Earth o f 
2199 -  and there is a strict division between the two” (99). Gordon’s analysis, despite 
being a flawed reading of Baudrillard that renders ironic his accusation of the 
misappropriation of Baudrillard by the Wachowskis (if his accusations are accurate, then 
his flawed explication of Baudrillard’s work equally constitutes a misappropriation), 
should nevertheless be considered more closely since the two mentioned points have 
relevant implications for The Matrix and Baudrillard’s theory. Before addressing these 
two points of critique, I would like to highlight two specific areas where Gordon 
incorrectly diagnoses Baudrillard’s theory.
Firstly, Gordon contextualizes the content of Baudrillard’s work through 
critiquing what he sees as an extravagant and fantastic rhetorical style: “One needs first to
The film’s intertextual elements range, for Gordon, from Messianic themes found in Christianity and Star 
Wars to its borrowings of the concept of cyberspace from tire cyberpunk genre, in particular from Gibson’s 
Neuromancer.
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place Baudrillard’s sweeping, often hyperbolic pronouncements -  that simulation, or 
what he calls ‘hyperreality,’ has completely taken over the contemporary world -  in 
perspective” (88). This perspective, for Gordon, is one of seeing Baudrillard’s work as a 
science fiction form of theory that ought to be read metaphorically as an exaggeration 
along the same lines as the work of George Orwell (88). Gordon’s critique of 
Baudrillard’s rhetoric, while relying exclusively on the work of Istvan Cscisery-Ronay 
Jr., does not offer any specific details or examples that would show the validity of the 
claim. Instead, the implicit assumption at work in Gordon’s critique is, as Hegarty points 
out, reading Baudrillard’s work as uncritical o f what it analyses as a result of lacking an 
identifiable form of ideological critique. Gordon may very well be correct, as he later 
argues, that the elements of simulation, hyperreality, and virtual reality in Baudrillard 
appeal to science fiction filmmakers (89), but his uncritical denouncement of 
Baudrillard’s theory through its rhetoric is unpersuasive and, at best, reflects Gordon’s 
own biases.
Gordon’s botched reading of Baudrillard continues when he shifts the context of 
critique from rhetoric to that of content. He argues that Baudrillard’s theory of 
simulation is grounded in a misinformed analysis of virtual reality and cyberculture: 
“Ironically, although Baudrillard has been a tremendously influential critic of virtual 
reality, he has little knowledge of cyberculture but began his critique of hyperreality by 
attacking TV advertising and theme parks years before the digital revolution that brought 
about the Internet, the PC, and virtual reality” (89). The inaccuracy of such a reading is 
partly due to the fact that Gordon only refers to the texts Simulacra and Simulation and 
America, which in isolation from his other works can easily produce a skewed
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interpretation. I would insist that it is simply incorrect that Baudrillard began his analysis 
of hyperreality though critiquing just TV advertising and theme parks. For instance, his 
first book The System o f Objects talks at length about technology and its effects on 
consciousness, specifically seen in the gadget and the way in which its metafunctionality 
(its accessories, degree of automation, motivations o f fashion) distorts in surpassing 
functionality plain and simple: “Too many accessory fimctions are introduced from the 
point of view of which the object answers no need other than the need to function; it 
answers, in other words, to the functional superstition according to which for any 
operation there is -  there must be -  a corresponding object, and if none exists then one 
must be invented” (Baudrillard, System 113). Deploying a form of structural linguistics, 
Baudrillard shows how the relationship between object and human has been displaced by 
a variety of factors; there is no longer a determined use-value for an object as its role is 
far more implicated in a culturally coded system of meaning where an object’s sign value 
and its prestige become key aspects of its meaning. An object’s denotations are, for the 
most part, eclipsed by coimotations in what Baudrillard will term empty functionalism: 
“The fact remains that it works. As a sort of dangling parenthesis, as an object detached 
from its function, what the ‘gizmo’ or the ‘thingummyig’ suggests is a vague and 
limitless functionality -  or perhaps better the mental picture of an imaginary 
functionality” (114). An example of such secondary or empty functionalism is the tail fin 
on cars that in reality weighs them down, but that projects an ultra modernism in 
resembling the aerospace technology of rockets and simultaneously the natural 
aerodynamics of fish. As Hegarty astutely points out, the imaginary function of objects 
in conjunction with the idea of the freedom of choice was really ahead of its time:
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The ideology of freedom of choice is further maintained by the targeting of 
specific groups by particular advertisers, and promulgated in, for example, 
specialist magazines or websites. As Baudrillard was writing his analyses of 
consumer society in the late 1960’s, the appeal to consumers that imagine 
themselves to be ‘different’ was less pronounced than today (he mentions 
‘personalization’ of objects, but the massive incorporation o f ‘alternatives’ 
offered by subcultures had yet to occur). (Hegarty 16)
In The Consumer Society, Baudrillard adds additional layers of interpretation to his 
analysis of the object and its role in a culturally coded system. One of the more 
important points raised in this text regards cultural recycling, where objects begin, for 
Baudrillard, to operate according to models and combinatorial variants as opposed to, for 
example, fulfilling a new practical need in society: “The ludic represents a very particular 
type of investment: it is not economic (useless object) and not symbolic (the 
gadget/object has no soul), but consists in a play with combinations, a combinatorial 
modulation: a play on the technical variants or potentialities of the object -  in innovation 
a playing with the rules o f play, in destruction a playing with life and death as the 
ultimate combination” (Baudrillard, Consumer Society 114). Cultural recycling, its 
dependence on models and combinatorial variants, will play a large part in defining the 
later mechanics of simulation for Baudrillard. The examples shown from Baudrillard’s 
first two texts are not exhaustive in nature in terms of delineating the history of his 
thought, but they do show how Baudrillard was concerned with technological innovation 
and accompanying changes in perception, and how these elements in turn affected 
society. In conclusion, the metafrinotionality of objects, the ideology of freedom of
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choice, and combinatorial modulation very much displace, for Baudrillard, a direct 
correspondence of object to person -  the object is no longer simply being used for an 
intended purpose. Thus, it is technology and perception and not, as Gordon would have 
it, cyberculture and virtual reality that characterize Baudrillard’s vision of hyperreality. 
Indeed, Hegarty will stress this point especially with regards to the importance of 
considering perception in an analysis of Baudrillard when addressing Kellner’s critique 
of Baudrillard being technologically deterministic:
This (media) technology is what ensures the ‘precession of simulacra’, the 
precedence of simulation over all that already existed as real, and it is not 
technology as such that determines, but models, and part of this cannot be 
separated from advances in technology (the idea of the model being inextricably 
linked with production). In other words, it is not only technology, but the 
alteration in perception that accompanies {not results from) it, that ‘determines’ 
our mode of perception. (Hegarty 60)
And although Hegarty’s response does not directly address Gordon’s assertion that 
Baudrillard’s theory of hyperreality is simply “hyperbolic and apocalyptic 
pronouncements” or a “visionanary SF poem or film” as he borrows from critic Csicery- 
Ronay Jr., it does go far in showing that Baudrillard’s theory is far more sophisticated 
than Gordon would make it out to be -  especially given the importance of giving 
sufficient consideration to the role that technology and perception bear for contemporary 
culture.
The second area where Gordon fails to accurately present Baudrillard’s ideas is in 
his analysis of simulation itself. The first example Gordon gives of Baudrillard’s theory
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of simulation is the Borges tale. He deploys this example inaccurately in repeating 
Felluga’s error (as analyzed above); that is, this example still retains a clear separation 
between representation and simulation. Such a distinction is simply impossible when 
dealing with the third order of simulacra, because simulation has already absorbed 
representational techniques:
So it is with simulation, insofar as it is opposed to representation. The latter starts 
from the principle that the sign and the real are equivalent (even if this 
equivalence is utopian, it is a frindamental axiom). Conversely, simulation starts 
from the utopia of this principle of equivalence, the radical negation o f the 
sign as value, from the sign as reversion and death sentence of every reference. 
Whereas representation tries to absorb simulation by interpreting it as false 
representation, simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation as itself as 
a simulacrum. (Baudrillard, Simulations 11)
Still, the more glaring error in Gordon’s explication of simulation is his conflation of the 
phases of the image with the orders o f simulacra, which leaves Gordon incorrectly 
working with the fourth order of simulacra.* Although there is some debate as to whether 
a fourth order of simulacra actually exists in Baudrillard’s work, that is whether the 
fractal order stands apart from the third order of simulation,^ it is in the context of 
Gordon’s article a fundamentally different issue. I will return to the question of a fractal
* Gordon writes the following; “Baudrillard speaks of four orders of simulation: in the first, the image 
reflects reality; in the second, it masks reality; in the third, “it makes the absence of a profound reality”; and 
fourth, “it has no relation to reality whatsoever, it is its own pure simulation”” (Gordon 89).
 ̂Tliere is debate as to whether the fourth order of simulacra, the fiactal, ought to be designated as an order 
to itself. The clearest description of the fractal order occurs in Baudrillard’s Transparency o f  Evil, but is 
already suggested, very briefly, in earher texts such as Simulations. Hegarty summarizes the fractal as 
follows: “The new fractal dimension(s) is one where value becomes arbitrary: random and fixed at the 
same time. This means that all can become political, but not properly so, all can be sexual, but not fully, all 
can become economic or aesthetic. All of tliis occurs at the same time, and it becomes impossible to 
separate out previously discrete areas of human activity (Hegarty 64).
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order in my discussion of Agent Smith, and the difference in the theories of Baudrillard 
and Deleuze with regards to the concept of repetition. Simulacra and Simulation, 
however, presents three orders of simulacra and, possibly, a complementary theory of the 
successive phases of the image. With regards to the phases o f the image and the orders of 
simulacra, Hegarty explains how they can be seen to operate in conjunction:
The second phase is equivalent to the counterfeit, the third to production, and the 
fourth is Baudrillard’s main concern (simulation). The four phases, like the three 
orders of simulacra, signal that there is an element of progress towards the final 
stage. The fourth phase of the image is equivalent to the third order of simulacra, 
but the use made of the phases insists less on assigning a set, historically 
determined place for each element of development. The phases of the image also 
install ‘basic reality’ as a category that is always within simulatedness. (Hegarty
51)
The orders of simulacra, in addition to having historical contingency, also demarcate an 
increasing degree of reification with each successive stage of simulacra where 
signification (meaning and value) becomes progressively more absorbed by simulation 
until the third order of simulacra, that of simulation, when they become utterly 
inseparable from the structural logic of simulation.
The following is a brief explication of the orders of simulacra. The first order of 
simulacra, the counterfeit, occurs during the Renaissance and is based on a natural law of 
value. The counterfeit order marks a decisive historical shift for Baudrillard in that 
society ceases to organize itself in a cruel hierarchy where social rank is static and social 
relations are determined by obligation and reciprocity. Against an utterly transparent
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society, the Renaissance brings with it a form of social mobility as, for example, fashion 
proliferates into distinctive signs that are no longer responsible for a necessary 
reciprocity, but instead play on appearances in making reference to a real world without 
obligatory relations (Baudrillard, Simulations 84-5). For Baudrillard, then, what he will 
call “the metaphysics of natural law” marks a decisive turn from exclusively obligatory 
and transparent signs in the Feudal order to a democratized and arbitrary sign in the 
Renaissance with a playing with the boundaries o f reality and appearance. The natural 
simulacrum feigns an obligatory bond to a closed system of blood, rank and caste, but in 
actuality is emancipated and enjoys the freedom of new combinations, arbitrary 
connections, and counterfeit values. It has the power to imitate nature through materials 
like stucco, a single and equivalent substance that mimics “velvet curtains, wooden 
corniches, charnel swelling of the flesh” (88). Indeed, stucco can be seen to foreshadow 
the second order of simulacra, the order of production. Similar to the equivalency that 
stucco exudes during the Renaissance, the order of production operates according to a 
market value where serial repetition and mass equivalence marks the transition to the 
Industrial Revolution. Unlike the counterfeit where the distinction between an original 
and a copy is played out or is at least presupposed, the second order of simulacra operates 
on a principle of effacing difference through the mechanical reproduction “of two or of n 
identical objects” (94-5). The only remaining origin to consider during the Industrial 
Revolution is that of technique, that is the possibility of serial reproduction. Baudrillard 
deploys the critiques of Benjamin and McLuhan here to show that the principle of 
production wins over “productive force” in the way that art and media mutate structurally 
so that reproduction becomes both origin and final goal in terms of social value (98-99).
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Art and media (cinema, photography, fashion, publicity, information and communication) 
form industrial simulacra in that the social value of these media is found in their serial 
reproduction, that is the event where medium wins over the message and productive force 
(100). The industrial simulacra is most evident for Baudrillard in what he sees as 
reproduction, the conveyor belt and “dead work” eclipsing “live work” abolishing any 
sense of history where “social finality is lost in the series. The simulacra wins out over 
history” (100).
The third order of simulacra, simulation, operates according to a structural logic. 
Unlike the Industrial Revolution, which was characterized by reproducibility or, in other 
words, a quantitative equivalence in production, the post-industrial age is marked by 
distinctive oppositions (101). Pre-coded binaries feign referential distinctions and allow 
for simulation -  the metaphysics o f the code -  to operate internally without recourse to 
outside signification. The neutrality of the sign is explained by Genosko as an internally 
produced, structural manipulation of signification; “Baudrillard thinks that the 
generalization of the sign form takes place through the process by which the code 
controls the production of meaning and difference through a ‘structural manipulation’ 
that is irreducible to a conscious psychology of the use of signs for social differentiation, 
which is to say, for the sake of a lived distinction” (Genosko, Masters o f Implosion 114). 
The fact that Baudrillard’s third order of simulation produces meaning and difference 
internally functions not only to simulate a world of representation and references, but, 
more importantly, it serves to stabilize the structurality o f the code in its anticipatory 
inertia. The anterior finality of the code makes it transcendent in that all distinctions are 
already determined in advance. His examples include questions and answers for political
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and public polls, tests, surveys, referenda, etc. The question always anticipates the 
answer;
The entire communication system has passed from a complex syntactic structure 
of language to a binary system of question/answer signals -  perpetual testing.
Tests and referenda are, as we know, perfect forms of simulation; the question 
induces the answer, it is design-ated in advance. The referendum, then, is only an 
ultimatum: the unilateral question is precisely not an interrogation anymore, but 
the immediate imposition of a meaning which simultaneously completes the 
cycle. Every message is a verdict, delivered like the verdict of polling statistics. 
(Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange 62).
Simulation, thus, finds itself as an almost absolute structural law in society where 
material and conceptual referentiality (use-value, exchange-value, etc.) has lost its 
capacity to operate within a representational discourse, and instead of labour power, 
fashion, conscious/unconscious thought, and acts of resistance functioning in opposition 
to a economic and political systems, models of simulation absorb each of these facets as 
merely another commodity form. The structural code of simulation overwhelms 
signification to the extreme boundary where all value becomes equivalent, that is the state 
where the sole referentiality o f a sign is to be found in the equivalence of yet another sign 
ad infinitum -  the signifier of another signifier, etc. It is the death of the real as 
Baudrillard will put it;
The systems of reference for production, signification, the affect, substance and 
history, all this equivalence to a ‘real’ content, loading the sign with the burden of 
‘utility’, with gravity -  its form of representative equivalence -  all this is over
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with. Now the other stage of value has the upper hand, a total relativity, general 
commutation, combination and simulation -  simulation, in the sense that, from 
now on, signs are exchanged against each other rather than against the real (it is 
not that they just happen to be exchanged against each other, they do so on 
condition that they are no longer exchanged against the real). (6-7)
Without recourse to an external point of view (epistemological, historical, etc.), the code 
works temporally, pre-programming every signifying element so as to ensure the code’s 
absolute command and control. Again, pre-coded distinctions circulate in simulation, but 
only in such a way as to mask the fact that referential meaning has collapsed. 
Combinatorial variants are ceaselessly reproduced in an endless cycle and are always 
already generated from abstract models.
Returning to Gordon’s critique of the Wachowski brothers’ use of Baudrillard, it 
is ironic that he would claim that the brothers misappropriated Baudrillard’s theory of 
simulation in The Matrix while, evidently, repeating the very same error. His analysis is 
flawed both in his attack on Baudrillard’s rhetoric as well as the incorrect conflation of 
the orders of simulacra with the phases of the image. Still, Gordon’s other two points of 
critique, I would maintain, have a significant impact on reading The Matrix through 
Baudrillard’s version of simulation. His first point argues that The Matrix, unlike 
Baudrillard’s pessimistic work, offers a solution to the problem of simulation. This line 
of argument is questionable. Gordon would here seem to be implying that presenting a
Tliis point is further contextualized in an analogy to Gibson’s cyberpunk, but what really interests me 
about his argument is the fact that he sees no solution to simulation in Baudrillard; '"The Matrix taps into 
this new mythology to invert Gibson’s notion of cyberspace, creating not a New Jerusalem but a cy ber-hell. 
In a virtual prison of the Matrix, human beings are maintained in a permanent dream state, unaware they 
are merely slaves of the machine. Just as The Matrix plays on but inverts Gibson’s notion of cyberspace, so 
it also plays on Baudrillard’s ideas of simulation, but without Baudrillard’s pessimism, because The Matrix 
offers a solution to the problem of simulation whereas Baudrillard believes there is none” (Gordon 88).
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watered-down version of Baudrillard’s theory in The Matrix allows the Wachowski s to 
present a solution to the problem of simulation that is otherwise unavailable in a more 
accurate reading of Baudrillard. If this is the implication that Gordon would like to 
assert, then it still does not reconcile with the reading that he provides of simulation or 
hyperreality. An always already totalizing version of simulation would be necessary, I 
believe, to reach the conclusion that no solution is possible. And yet, Gordon clearly 
insists that Baudrillard’s simulation is not entirely totalizing: “Baudrillard’s central idea 
is that, in the postmodern world, the real has been almost totally displaced by the 
simulated” (Gordon 89). Despite the fact that this conclusion is reached through 
Gordon’s flawed reading of the Borges tale and the orders of simulacra, it still makes for 
a conclusion that is worth considering. I would like to address the question of whether 
77/e Maf(r/x “apparently misunderstands or intentionally simplifies” (Gordon 100) 
Baudrillard prior to returning to the issue of whether Baudrillard’s version of simulation 
is really hopeless, and, thus, pessimistic, perhaps even nihilistic.
According to Gordon, the people imprisoned inside the cybernetic matrix who 
live in hyperreality provide one example of simulation that occurs in the film. The 
conceptual backdrop of The Matrix, of having humanity enslaved by machines and 
harvested for body heat, holds more significance, I believe, for the visual and plot 
thematics of the film than it does for its intellectual cachet, as Gordon would put it. This 
conceptual context in lieu of a Baudrillardian reading should not necessarily emphasize
' ’ Gordon’s description of the simulation of the film is as follows; "The Matrix deals with what Baudrillard 
would call ‘the fourth order of simulation,’ with no relation to reality whatsoever. That is, the everyday 
world in which Neo exists is totally false, a dream world with no substance and no relation to 2199 
(although it does strongly resemble the present-day world of the movie’s audience). Tire machines have 
created a virtual reality simulacrum of the world of 1999, a world wiiich no longer exists in the fiitme”
(91).
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points regarding cyberspace and cybernetics in that the occupants of the matrix are 
cybernetically hacked on a micro-molecular level, but it should, instead, stress that this 
form of absolute command and control plays out in the mundane repetition of the events 
of the matrix, which effaces the possibility of difference since the program constructs in 
advance the possibilities of social movement and interaction. The prisoners of the matrix 
are perpetually living in the simulated world of 1999, but on the outside the rebels are 
living in the real world of 2199. Thus, Gordon’s second point o f critique that The Matrix 
maintains a clear separation of the two worlds, the 1999 version of the matrix and the 
real, post-apocalyptic one of 2199, indeed has merit. This point of critique is also 
mentioned by a number of other critics. David Webberman, for instance, makes a 
convincing claim in his essay that the film readdresses the older philosophical problem of 
the difference between reality and illusion as seen in Plato’s cave allegory, and 
T>QSC3xiQs'’s Meditations. However, in order to make this claim Weberman points out in a 
footnote the appearance of Simulacra and Simulations in the film, and proceeds to 
directly associate Baudrillard with the postmodern without any explication of 
Baudrillard’s work. The postmodern problem, for Webberman, then becomes the 
blurring line between reality and simulation which he sees as simply not a new 
philosophical problem. Moreover, contrary to Baudrillard’s theory of simulation, 
Webberman provides an incorrect definition of simulation that at the core includes 
representation: “Simulation is a means of representing, in a life-like manner, objective 
processes and subjective experiences that may or many not have existed before, typically 
with the aid of computers” (Webberman 230). Similar philosophical lines of argument 
concerning Plato and/or Descartes in relation to The Matrix are presented by a number of
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critics in The Matrix and Philosophy, and Exploring the Matrix: Visions o f the Cyber 
Present. Although there is a clear connection between Baudrillard’s theory of simulation 
and the work of Plato, the former, I believe, does introduce new and different 
philosophical problems. I will return to the connection between Baudrillard and Plato at 
the beginning of chapter two in outlining how Baudrillard and Deleuze begin with Plato’s 
theory of the simulacrum, but develop the concept along different vectors.
Perhaps the most intriguing critique o f the kind of simulation occurring in The 
Matrix comes directly from Baudrillard himself who, similarly to the mentioned critics, 
interprets simulation, at least initially, as being confused within older philosophic ideas. 
In an interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, Baudrillard explains how The Matrix falls 
into Platonic categories:
Yes, but already there have been other films that treat the growing indistinction 
between the real and the virtual: The Truman Show, Minority Report, or even 
Mulholland Drive, the masterpiece of David Lynch. The Matrix's value is chiefly 
as a synthesis of all that. But there the set-up is cruder and does not truly evoke 
the problem. The actors are in the matrix, that is, in the digitized system of things; 
or, they are radically outside it, such as in Zion, the city of resistors. But what 
would be interesting is to show what happens when these two worlds collide. The 
most embarrassing part of the film is that the new problem of simulation is 
confused with its classical, Platonic treatment. This is a serious flaw. (Genosko 
and Bryx 2)
Baudrillard, quite humorously, will add that “77/e Matrix is surely the kind of film about 
the matrix that the matrix would have been able to produce” (2). The insistence on
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maintaining a separation between the world of the cybernetic matrix and a world of the 
Zion resistors precludes The Matrix from presenting a vision of simulation for 
Baudrillard. The problematic for The Matrix, it would seem, is that it presents a duality 
of categories; the real (or the more real) being defined by the existence of a material Zion 
and its resistance to the represented simulation of the virtual reality o f the matrix 
program. In short, simulation here is still caught up within a contrast or distinction to 
representation in that we understand the simulated reality o f the matrix program only 
through the real experience of the resistors, such as when Morpheus explains this exact 
distinction to Neo within the construct program. However, Baudrillard hints at how The 
Matrix could have deployed or more closely resembled simulation. This, he says, would 
have taken a collapse of the distinction between the two worlds. Such an implosive force 
would be that of simulation since the two poles of reference would necessarily lose their 
distinctiveness, plunging the entire system into a space that lacks referentiality, which 
effectively would remove choice.
It is worth noting that the film trilogy does expand on the structure of the 
cybernetic matrix at two particular points, but this still does not add sufficient meaning, 
for Baudrillard, to redeem the matrix from its entrapment in a Platonic dualism. For 
instance in The Matrix, we find out from Agent Smith during his interrogation of 
Morpheus that the current version of the matrix is not the first. Smith explains how the 
first version of the matrix was rejected by its occupants due to its utopian configuration: 
“Did you know that the first matrix was designed to be a perfect human world? Where 
none suffered, where everyone would be happy. It was a disaster. No one would accept 
the program. Entire crops were lost” (Wachowski 361). Following the same theme. The
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Matrix Reloaded introduces the architect of the matrix, whom Baudrillard calls a pseudo- 
Freud figure, who in conversation with Neo explains to him that he, the saviour of 
humanity, the “one”, is already a pre-programmed anomaly in the matrix that 
supplements an unbalanced part of the matrix equation. The architect explains it as 
follows;
Your life is the sum of a remainder of an unbalanced equation inherent in the 
programming of the matrix. You are the eventuality of an anomaly, which despite 
my sincerest efforts I have been unable to eliminate from what is otherwise a 
harmony o f mathematical precision. While it remains a burden assiduously 
avoided, it is not unexpected and thus not beyond a measure of control [ .. .]. {The 
Matrix Reloaded)
The pseudo-Freud expands his explanation of the programming of the matrix to state that 
it extends to include the world of Zion and its resistance. His explanation would initially 
seem to indicate the exact collision of the two worlds that Baudrillard proposes is 
necessary for The Matrix trilogy to achieve third order simulation. Such a prospect 
would see the programming of the cybernetic matrix working in totality where not only 
the occupants o f the matrix but those seemingly radically outside it, as Baudrillard notes, 
are equally implicated within the anterior finality of pre-programmed, combinatorial 
models. I will return to this example after considering Baudrillard’s objection to this 
scene. He will object to this scene as being indicative of simulation, but in so doing will.
Baudrillard describes the scene as follows: “The pseudo-Freud who speaks at the film’s [The Matrix 
Reloaded] conclusion puts it well: at a certain moment, we reprogrammed the matrix in order to integrate 
anomalies into the equation. And you, the resistors, comprise a part of it. Thus we are, it seems, within a 
total virtual circuit without an exterior” (Genosko and Bryx 3).
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importantly, shift the context of analysis from one of the content of The Matrix to that of 
the film and its complicity within the global economy of cultural products:
Here again I am in theoretical disagreement (laughter). The Matrix presents the 
image of a monopolistically total force of the current situation, and in this way 
collaborates in its refraction. Basically, its dissemination on a world scale is 
complicit with the film itself. On this point it is worth recalling Marshall 
McLuhan: the medium is the message. The message of The Matrix is its own 
diffusion by an uncontrollable and proliferating contamination. (Genosko and 
Bryx 3)
Baudrillard argues that the content of The Matrix trilogy -  its value as a cultural text -  
finds its expression through the front loading of the techniques used to promote the 
release of the films. Such an example is to be seen in the way the Wachowskis attempted 
to solicit publicity material from Baudrillard. He explains his contact with the 
Wachowskis in an interview with Hegarty: “They asked me to do something on the new 
one, actually. They got in touch when they started filming it. There had been something 
on the simulacrum in the first one. This time they wanted to set up a private showing for 
me, and for me to write something on it. That kind of thing professionalizes you though -  
I ’m supposed to be in the virtual so it’s me you need to go and see. Always the same 
misunderstanding [.. .]” (Hegarty 140). Although Baudrillard refused the Wachowskis, 
the intention behind the offer undoubtedly was one that strove to add intellectual cachet 
to the publicity surrounding the release of the trilogy. Another example of the 
promotional techniques deployed in the release of The Matrix sequels, which Baudrillard 
refers to as the dissemination of the film on a world scale, is the way in which The Matrix
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following prior to the film’s release: “It will be shown simultaneously in 65 countries in a 
campaign never before attempted with the release of a movie” (BBC News). The film hit 
screens in major cities such as London, Los Angeles, New York, Moscow and Tokyo at 
the same time. According to the same news report, the issues of popularity and piracy 
were behind the global release of the film: “Distributors Warner Brothers say they want 
to capitalise on the trilogy’s popularity and deter potential pirates.” Indeed, it is quite 
clear why Baudrillard opts to diagnose the value of the film trilogy as being symptomatic 
of consumer culture. Although the values of big-budget films, especially Hollywood 
blockbusters, are always implicated fi-om the beginning in an economy of cultural 
products, this seems to especially be the case with The Matrix trilogy. The films’ 
medium and message are deeply intertwined within the economic strategies of promotion 
and deterrence, making the trilogy, first and foremost, a consumer commodity.
William Merrin expands on Baudrillard’s perspective of the trilogy being 
implicated in a global economics of consumer products by analyzing the American 
context of filmmaking:
Of course, to the best of our knowledge, our world is not a virtual reality illusion 
and so The M atrix’s central revelation has its own shelf-life. If  this simulation 
pales, therefore, upon leaving the cinema, Baudrillard’s does not, for his claims 
about our simulacral world are more radical that those offered in The Matrix. For 
him, simulacra are efficacious as the real: they are not unreal media productions 
(which is, after all, what The Matrix still proposes), rather they are precessionary, 
coded, and materialized models that come to invade and invest all areas of our
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lives, experience and behaviours as the real, such that we too reproduce them as 
reality. (Merrin 9)
Merrin, quoting Gane, will go on to conclude that Baudrillard was ahead of both The 
Matrix and Gibson’s cyberpunk in diagnosing the symptom of the matrix in America’s 
cinematography; “Only America has this power of the cinematographisation of everyday 
life, he says, 7 / is there that I  discover the ‘matrix’ o f the cinema’ {Qzxve 1993 34). Here, 
two years before Gibson, and seventeen years before the Wachowski Brothers,
Baudrillard theorizes ‘the matrix’. This matrix, however, is the simulacral power of the 
image to invade, invest and assume the force of the real. The matrix is the simulacrum” 
(9). Baudrillard and Merrin would seem to agree that the central concern with analyzing 
The Matrix is positioning it within a political economy, where the film’s relevance is 
chiefly seen as an effect of the media structures that produced it. The Matrix, thus, 
becomes a simulacral effect of promotional strategies, such as advertising, for Baudrillard 
and a simulacral effect of American cinema for Merrin. However, Baudrillard’s shifting 
of the context of analysis for The Matrix from that of plot structure and characters to that 
of a political economy, however accurate the conclusions reached, still, I believe, raises 
the question of how to characterize the textuality of the film. In other words, if 
Baudrillard is correct in asserting that The Matrix is not an example of third order 
simulation, then what other strategies can be used to describe what occurs in the films?
Returning to Baudrillard’s critique of the architect of the matrix, it is telling that 
he refers to McLuhan in order to shift the context of his analysis away from a textual 
reading of the film. If we retain his method of criticism but do not follow his shift in 
context, then we arrive at a description of the second order of simulacra. The description
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
37
offered of the industrial simulacra echoes his critique of The Matrix in its use of 
McLuhan, but also in the significance placed on the concept of technique/^ Indeed, as 
Baudrillard explains, The Matrix is complicit with its own message and seems 
determined to proliferate as such. Again, unlike having pre-coded meanings already 
circulating in advance, the matrix program is in the process of reproducing its truth, and 
in its proliferation seeks a quantitative equivalence of its message, which positions it in 
the second order of simulacra, and not in the third. If the message of the matrix is its own 
diffusion as a type of serial reproducibility, then its technique operates according to 
market values where the mechanical, or more precisely the cybernetic, production of 
serial repetition and mass equivalence gets played out. Here a contrast that Baudrillard 
makes between the second and third orders of simulacra is worth pointing out:
And here it is a question of a reversal of origin and finality, for all the forms 
change once they are not so much mechanically reproduced but even conceived 
from the point-of-view o f their very reproducibility, diffracted from a generating 
nucleus we call the model. Here we are in the third-order simulacra; no longer 
that of the counterfeit or an original as in the first-order, nor that o f the pure series 
as in the second. Here are the models from which proceed all forms according to 
the modulation of their differences. Only affiliation to the model makes sense, and
McLuhan and Benjamin are used extensively in showing the importance of the industrial simulacra and 
how it differs from Marxist critiques. The significance of the industrial simulacra is first and foremost 
identified in its technique of reproduction that wins over live laboiu and, thus, the technique, for 
Baudrillard, can no longer be understood as a productive force. Here he writes that “Technique as medium 
dominates not only the “message” of the product (its use-value) but also the force-of-work that Marx 
wished to make the revolutionary message of production. Benjamin and McLuhan saw this matter more 
clearly than Marx; they saw the true message: the true ultimatum was in reproduction itself. And that 
production no longer has any sense; its social finality is lost in the series. The simulacra win out over 
liistory” (Baudrillard Simulations 100). Still, it would be incorrect to exclusively equate McLuhan as a 
theorist of the second order of simulacra, since his woik importantly reappears during Baudrillard’s 
discussion of the relevance of tactihty in the third of simulation.
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nothing flows any longer according to its end, but proceeds from the model, the 
“signifier of reference,” which is a kind of anterior finality and the only 
resemblance there is. (Baudrillard, Simulations 100-01)
That the programming of the matrix has complete command and control over both worlds 
signals its technique of the reproduction of its own truth; this technique is both origin and 
final goal for the matrix. Consider for instance what the architect says to Neo: “Which 
brings us at last to the moment of truth where in the fundamental flaw [the unbalanced 
equation of the matrix] is ultimately expressed and the anomaly [Neo] revealed as both 
beginning and end” {The Matrix Reloaded). The matrix program hinges on the serial 
reproducibility found in second order simulation, as indeed Neo, according to the 
architect, has already been both origin and finality for the matrix on five previous 
occasions: “The matrix is older than you know. I prefer counting from the emergence of 
one integral anomaly to the emergence o f the next, in which case this is the sixth version” 
(ibid). It is precisely this technique, seen as the goal of the matrix as both its origin and 
finality, that defines the function of the matrix programming in the film. This technique 
of the matrix can be clearly distinguished from the workings o f third order simulacra. 
Indeed as Baudrillard points out, “And not only shouldn’t we look to technique or the 
economy for the secrets of the code; it is, contrary, the very possibility of industrial 
production that we should look in the genesis o f the code and the simulacra” {Simulations 
101). Analysing The Matrix from the standpoint of the second order of simulacra, and 
not the third, supports Smith’s explanation of the failure of the first utopian matrix 
program, where the programmers would still be in the process o f attempting to efface 
difference through the reproduction of the same, “of two or of n identical objects” (84-5).
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The programmers’ interest in creating a perfect version of the matrix still lies in the realm 
of production, or more precisely, a consistent re-production of equivalent and 
reproducible codes that would be accepted on a mass scale by the occupants of the 
matrix, and not rejected as was the case with the first utopian version. In short, the sort 
of mass failure of the utopian version of the matrix would not occur in third order 
simulation simply because such a failure would already and necessarily have to be 
temporally accounted for in advance and, henceforth, issue from the code. It is 
reasonable to assume fi'om Smith’s description of the loss o f entire crops of human 
battery cells -  the energy source upon which the machines depend and the reason for the 
existence of the matrix -  and, subsequently, the necessity to create a better or more 
effective matrix program, that indeed the matrix program is struggling with its origins and 
ends in order to build the perfect matrix program -  one that is totalizing in its closed- 
circuitry. And in fact if we believe the architect’s claim that there have existed six 
versions of the matrix following the failure of the utopian one, then the matrix has 
successfully repeated a consistent reproduction of the program.
Second order simulation also reinforces Felluga’s and Gordon’s reading of the 
construct program through the Borges tale, where the distinction between the real world 
and the cybernetic one is still, at least, presupposed. The construct program shows a 
simulacrum of the real post-apocalyptic world of 2199, and, thus, feigns to reproduce the 
real through a “representational imaginary” (Baudrillard, Simulations 3). The very 
existence of the construct program, that is, the possibility of using it so as to represent a 
more or less real distinction between the two worlds in The Matrix shows that the 
construct program is still functioning as other to the matrix program. This other, the
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construct program, effectively provides a standpoint from which it is possible to 
differentiate the pole o f the real world from that of the illusory one. The construct 
program, then, has to be necessarily seen as something that escapes or even supplements 
the coding of the matrix, and in this sense shows the impossibility o f reading the matrix 
according to the third order o f simulation, since recognizable distinctions do not exist in 
third order simulation in lieu of all distinctions having imploded into the make-up of the 
transcendent ftmction of the code. In other words, there is no longer any space under the 
reign of the code in which to make distinctions; only pre-coded binaries circulate that 
issue directly from the closed-circuitry of the code.
Finally, the scene with the architect, while initially supporting a reading for 
simulation through the anterior finality of the matrix’s code that seemingly extends to 
engulf both worlds, stops short of achieving third order simulation. Neo and the resistors 
consist of an anomalous and a not fully controllable variable within the matrix code. It is 
as if the architect claims that Neo has no choice in the matter of his anomalous DNA 
being reinserted into the code, which in turn would complete the closed circuit of the 
matrix, indeed, making it an example of the reign of the code. Despite the architect’s 
best efforts, as is revealed in a self admission, to eradicate the anomaly it nevertheless 
remains a variable in the matrix program. This variable is not unexpected phenomon as 
the architect claims but only a certain “measure of control” applies to it {The Matrix 
Reloaded). It is clear from the architect’s admission that the programming of the matrix 
is not in complete command and control over both the virtual world and the real one. 
Moreover, when Neo resists being reinserted into the code of the matrix, the pseudo- 
Freud begins depending on coercive rhetorical strategies -  for example, appealing
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desperately to Neo that the fate of humanity hinges on his decision to re-enter the 
matrix’s code; “the relevant issue is whether or not you are ready to accept the 
responsibility for the death of every human being in this world”, or phrased somewhat 
differently, “Failure to comply with this process will result in a cataclysmic system crash 
killing everyone connected to the matrix, which coupled with the extermination of Zion 
will ultimately result in the extinction of the entire human race” (ibid). Again, the matrix 
is describing second order simulacra through its technique; that is, the reproduction of its 
truth as origin and finality as opposed to already working according to pre-coded, 
simulated scenarios where, evidently, no choice would exist for Neo. Choice still 
remains in the matrix program despite the architect’s best efforts to conceal it through his 
rhetoric: “There are two doors. The door to your right leads to the source and the 
salvation o f Zion. The door to your left leads back to the matrix, to her [Trinity] and the 
end of your species. As you adequately put, the problem is choice’ (ibid). Third order 
simulation is not involved whenever individual choice exists, since choice constitutes a 
critical space fi'om which a distinction can be made between reality and illusion. 
Baudrillard explains the phenomenon of choice with regards to simulation in a fragment 
from Cool Memories IV\ “The -  always more or less funereal and melancholy -  charm of 
the simulacrum is that is allows us not to choose between illusion and reality” (115).
And yet quite clearly Neo chooses the door on the left. He risks the fate of humanity, and 
refuses the architect’s offer of being reinserted into the code. This example, thus, has to 
be seen as a coercive and persuasive offer made by the architect figure; a proposed 
conditionality (second order simulation) as opposed to a foreshadowed inevitability (third 
order simulation).
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The above examples strongly support the viability of reading The Matrix trilogy 
through Baudrillard’s concepts. And although the trilogy does not necessarily deploy a 
consistent version of third order simulacra, it does very much hint at the possibility of 
such a version occurring. Because as Baudrillard makes clear, the orders of simulacra are 
not entirely exclusive, but rather depend upon conditional shifts between the orders:
“Each order submits to the order following. Just like the order of the counterfeit was 
abolished by that of serial production (we can see how art has passed entirely into the 
realm of the “mechanical”), so in the same way the entire order of production is in the 
process of tumbling into operational simulation” (Simulations 101). In this way. The 
Matrix trilogy serves as a perfect example through which to conceptually diagram the 
extreme limit o f second order simulacra, one that almost approaches a lingering in the in- 
between of the second and third order of simulation. In fact, the scene that shows the 
interrogation of Neo by Agent Smith shows two points of transition, however brief, 
between the second and third orders of simulation: 1) a type of simulated surveillance 
that occurs in advance; and 2) a semiotic indeterminacy in the character of Neo.
The interrogation of Neo by Agent Smith is an early scene in The Matrix that 
follows Neo’s failed escape from the corporate tower in which he works for the software 
company. Metacortex. His failed escape plan was coordinated by Morpheus, identified 
as a well-known terrorist who is wanted on a variety of criminal charges, who earlier 
contacted Neo in his apartment by hacking into his desktop computer. It is in this earlier 
scene that the audience sees the other side of Neo’s life, the one involving his night life of 
creating and dealing in contraband software. Neo’s character is developed in a duality: 
the Thomas A. Anderson who works for a software company during the day, and the Neo
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who is a hacker by night. This scene is foregrounded as the viewer passes through one of 
a series of television sets, each separately showing the same Neo sitting alone at a table in 
an empty room. Agent Smith slowly enters the rooms, and begins methodically 
unraveling a string that opens the manila dossier entitled “Anderson, Thomas A.” This 
scene is one of the more significant ones in the trilogy, since it raises the issue of 
surveillance in connection to simulation. The television screens are seemingly recording 
and transmitting what occurs in the room. Also, Smith’s dossier reveals a surveillance 
file that he deliberately flips through as he explains to Neo: “As you can see, we’ve had 
our eye on you for some time now, Mr Anderson” (Wachowski 291). This dossier, 
presumably, contains the complete records of Mr. Anderson’s actions from birth to 
present, which indicates a form of total surveillance in advance. William Bogart explains 
how simulated surveillance is different from its more traditional practices:
[T]he entire field of observation and all its elements are projected into a scene 
where everything is capable o f circling back in on itself, where the offender is 
“netted” or captured in advance, the violation is already committed, the sentence 
already handed down, the time already served. Simulated surveillance is like a 
Mobius strip, with neither an inside nor an outside surface, or a Mandelbrot 
function that opens onto endless, nested levels of control, recording, speed traps. 
(Bogart 29)
Neo’s dual life of programmer and hacker inside the matrix is simulated in that 
surveillance precedes his actions. Thus, the way in which Neo hacks code and sells it as 
contraband software, which ought to designate a subversive act against the matrix, turns 
out to be a simulated gesture. As Agent Smith explains further to Neo, “It seems that you
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have been living two lives. In one life, you are Thomas A. Anderson, program writer for 
a respectable software company. You have a social security number, you pay your taxes, 
and you help your landlady carry out her garbage” (Wachowski 292). Agent Smith flips 
a page in the surveillance dossier prior to continuing, “The other life is lived in computers 
where you go by the hacker alias Neo, and are guilty of virtually every computer crime 
we have a law for” (292). Neo is not captured and interrogated, as we find out fi'om 
Smith, as a result of his illegal hacking activities, but rather because he has been 
contacted by the terrorist Morpheus. It thus follows that if Neo had not been contacted 
by Morpheus, the matrix would have let him continue hacking and dealing in illegal 
software. This example shows the type of simulated surveillance that Bogart 
hypothesizes, an utterly transparent system of surveillance;
The simulation of surveillance does not exactly mean the “illusion” of 
surveillance. Modem surveillance is not so much “illusory” as it is elevated to a 
kind of higher reality or, more exactly, pushed to its spatial and temporal limits by 
simulation. Simulation always aims for the “more real than real”; as a technical 
operation, we shall see, it works to eliminate, not foster, illusion. The better a 
simulation, the less awareness there is of the artifice that identifies it as a 
simulation [...] The simulation of surveillance, then, is not about creating an 
illusion of surveillance, but about rendering indiscernible, if you will, the fact of 
its illusion, viz., that control by observation technologies always involves, to 
some degree or other, the diminution of the appearance of deception. (Bogart 31- 
2)
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The interrogation scene in The Matrix does show this type of perfect transparency of 
surveillance in society that is already simulated in advance. Neo’s criminal activities are, 
thus, already identified and observed in advance but are seemingly disregarded since they 
pose no direct threat to the programming of the matrix -  in other words, his activities 
have already been accounted for within the reign of the code. He is (already) guilty, as 
Smith points out, of just about every computer crime for which the matrix has a law. 
Furthermore, the duality of Neo’s character is illusory. Although he is already guilty of 
every possible computer crime within the matrix, these actions are still ambivalent in 
terms of not having a genuine effect within or against the code. This shows the semiotic 
implosion that occurs at the level of the code in third order simulacra: it illustrates the 
indeterminacy of distinctions, actions, thoughts. There is no social determinacy behind 
the illusory distinction of Neo as software programmer and software hacker: both are 
equally active and passive as they are complied and subversive within the reign of the 
code. The reign of the code, as Baudrillard explains, erases all identifiable meanings. 
There is no longer a correspondence between the referent and sign of Neo’s actions since 
it is simply a play and exchange of signifiers within the code; referents that would 
presuppose distinctive values no longer exist in third order simulacra: “At this level the 
question of signs, of their rational destination, their real or imaginary, their repression, 
their deviation, the illusion they create or that which they conceal, or their parallel 
meanings -  all of that is erased” (104). Indeed, helping his landlady take out garbage, 
paying his taxes, and hacking code are all equally complied within “the macro-molecular 
code of command and control” (104).
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The example o f the matrix’s surveillance in advance, and the indeterminacy of 
Neo’s duality both show a moment in The Matrix where third order simulation occurs. 
However, both examples quickly revert to the cruder, second order simulacra. Again, it 
is important to note that Neo is not brought in as a result of any of his own actions, but 
rather is interrogated as a result of being contacted by Morpheus. This point o f contact 
marks the exact juncture at which point surveillance in The Matrix reverts from its most 
perfect form of being simulated in advance to its more traditional and cruder forms, with 
the interrogating agent and his paper dossier. These crude tools present an illusory 
example of simulated surveillance. This makes The Matrix a less compelling example of 
simveillance than, as Baudrillard suggests. The Minority Report mà The Truman Show in 
terms of engaging a form of simulated surveillance that occurs in advance of events. 
Similarly, the indeterminacy of Neo’s dual character is replaced by determinacy when he 
is unplugged from the matrix. There is a very distinct determinacy behind the actions of 
the unplugged Neo: he becomes the “one,” the savior of humanity. The point at which he 
is unplugged from the matrix marks another reversion from third order simulacra to that 
of the second in the film. And again, it is made clear during his conversation with the 
architect where he chooses which decision to make. He rejects the architect’s coercive 
arguments in refusing to be reinserted into the code of the matrix, and thus shows that 
there is a definite determinacy behind his thoughts and actions. His resistance against the 
architect does not issue from the code, which is to say that his resistance is not already 
accounted for within the code, but rather his actions are legitimately subversive in 
interrupting the closed-circuit of the code. In opposition to his illusory duality where 
Neo was already a part of the “the genetic code: an erased record, unchangeable, of
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which we are no more than cells-for-reading” (Baudrillard, Simulations 105), his 
resistance against the architect has to be seen as a signifying element outside of the 
programming of the matrix’s code. Indeed, he introduces conflict and change into that 
code.
In conclusion. The Matrix trilogy does not provide a consistent vision of any 
single order of simulation from Baudrillard’s work. Instead, examples such as the 
matrix’s technique of reproducing the truth, the construct program’s ability to represent 
distinctions, and the architect’s coercive rhetorical strategies demonstrate the operation of 
second order simulation in the trilogy. Other examples such as the illusory duality of 
Neo’s character and the matrix’s simveillance point to brief moments in the trilogy as 
examples of third order simulation. It is important, I believe, to not just insist on either 
the existence or non-existence of any single aspect of Baudrillard’s theory, especially 
when concerning the orders of simulation. It is far more important to consider the 
function of each order, if not its applicability, to a particular text. Herein lies the problem 
for critics such as Felluga and Gordon whose reading strategies are singularly determined 
to either prove or disapprove the appearance of simulation in The Matrix. Their reading 
strategies are limited in that, to paraphrase Hegarty, they are superficial in highlighting 
one or a few ideas in isolation -  in this case, simulation (Hegarty 4). Moreover, 
Baudrillard emphasizes the importance of the transition from one order to another: “Each 
order submits to the order following” (Baudrillard, Simulations 101). And yet, it is not 
only a linear progression of the orders, “the precession of simulacra”, at stake in the work 
of Baudrillard. His analysis of Disneyland, for example, that although is indicative of an 
example of hyperreality, nevertheless shows a mixed operation of each of the orders of
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simulacra; “Disneyland is a perfect model of all the entangled orders of simulation” (23). 
If the orders are (or can be) entangled, given particular circumstances, then The Matrix 
trilogy is such an example.
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Chapter Two: Becoming, simulacra, and symbolic exchange in The Matrix trilogy
It is not only in Baudrillard’s work that one finds a developed theory of 
simulation. Deleuze’s work also develops a theory of simulation, but significantly one 
that differs in a number of key areas from that of Baudrillard. Since simulation is one of 
the chief concerns presented in the film trilogy, and since the application of Baudrillard’s 
theory to the trilogy showed significant examples o f simulation but not a comprehensive 
version of it, I plan to deploy Deleuze’s theory of simulation so as to expand the list of 
examples of different kinds of instances of simulation occurring in the films. As I 
showed in chapter one, Baudrillard’s orders of simulacra are useful with regards to 
reading specific scenes in The Matrix trilogy but such an application also showed that no 
single order was conceptually sufficient in accounting for all the examples of simulation 
in the films. This second chapter then extends the analysis of the first in applying a 
different theory of simulation in the effort of analysing further elements of simulation in 
the films. This reading strategy, specifically in relation to the figure of Agent Smith, 
will, I believe, show the conceptual limits of each theory through engaging with and, 
thus, accounting for varying events in the films through the two types of simulation 
theories.
There are a number of points of intersection between Baudrillard’s and Deleuze’s 
theorizations of the concept of the simulacrum that aid in showing the different 
trajectories through which each theory unfolds. The simulacrum, for both theorists, 
intersects the Platonic distinction of Idea-copy and it is from this initial contact that both 
Baudrillard and Deleuze rework the distinction so as to arrive at different definitions of
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the categories o f the copy and model. The copy and model are key terms in the 
contemporary theorization of simulacra. The reworking of these terms marks the point at 
which both theorists will shift the concept of the simulacrum away from a context of 
representation. This shift, however, occurs according to divergent vectors: Baudrillard’s 
theory of simulation becomes transcendent, whereas Deleuze’s theory becomes 
immanent. This divergence along transcendent/immanent lines is further evidenced 
through the way in which the two forms of simulation interact with the concepts of 
repetition, difference, and territoriality.
The initial moment of intersection of Baudrillard’s and Deleuze’s formulation of 
simulation appears in the overturning of Plato’s model o f representation, which is based 
on the distinction between the Idea and copy. The model o f representation, as Massumi 
shows, functions according to the mechanics of internal similarity: “The terms copy and 
model bind us to the world o f representation and objective (re)production. A copy, no 
matter how many times removed, authentic or fake, is defined by the presence or absence 
of internal, essential relations of resemblance to a model” (Massumi 2). The Platonic 
model of representation is a transcendent structure through which all signifying elements 
are attributed derivative value from the Idea: to echo Massumi’s comments, the copy for 
Plato is always defined by its internal and essential resemblance to the transcendent 
model. The copy is only ever in possession of the values inherent to the Idea in a 
secondary and, thus, derivative manner. Put in a semiotic context the Idea and copy 
function within the model as a signifying chain where the value of any particular copy
Daniel W. Smith’s “Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence: Two directions in Recent 
French Thought” was quite helpful in outlining how such a contrast between two philosophers could be 
made along a transcendent/immanent distinction, as well as quite aptly pointing out a number of the key 
areas in Deleuze’s thought that constitutes within an immanent network of concepts.
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hinges on that of the Idea. Such a structural schematic would see the formation of the 
sign -  meaning constructed through representation -  through the correlation of copies 
(signifiers) and the Idea (transcendental signifier). The good philosopher in this case 
would be the one who could best approximate the goodness of the Idea. It follows that a 
copy as signifier hinges upon the degree of separation from (its correlation to) the Idea 
whereby it is imbued with its meaning as value (its representational quality as a sign); 
that is, the scale upon which the value (the goodness) of a copy is judged is based on how 
closely it approximates (its presence or absence on a correlative scale) the quality 
inherent to the Idea. The function of the Platonic model is, thus, to be found in the way 
in which it supports and depends upon the very possibility of the reproducibility o f any 
particular copy, which is to say that the proper effect of the signifying chain is to 
populate the world with signs that in some way re-present the transcendent term of the 
Idea. If the initial movement within the Platonic model is one of internal resemblance 
whereby a copy can be said to possess an attribute in a secondary way, then the second 
movement is one of negative difference whereby the relative value of copies is 
distinguished amongst themselves and against the Idea. The second movement, that o f 
negative difference, would appear, for example, when two competing philosophers 
sought for the Idea goodness. It is not only an internal resemblance to the Idea (the way 
in which each philosopher possesses goodness) at play in such an example, but also the 
negative difference between the two, or however many, competing philosophers (how 
much goodness each philosopher possesses in relation to the other). It is also this 
negative difference through which the simulacrum will be opposed to the copy but not to 
the Idea, since the very value of the simulacrum can not be posited in a positive way as it
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does not pass through the Idea within the Platonic ontology. In this sense simulacra 
occupy a strange place within the Platonic formulation in that when seen as signs they 
refuse to derive value from the Idea, which is a break from the signifying chain of the 
structure of the model as well as a break from the mechanics of reproduction and 
representation. Unlike a copy that is a secondary possessor of the value of the Idea, 
simulacra only presuppose or, better yet, feign to possess such value in a secondary way. 
It is a difference between the good and the bad copy, as Jonathan Roffe notes: “in the 
Sophist, Socrates discusses the means with which we might distinguish between the 
philosopher (the good copy), who is in search of the Good (the model), and the sophist 
(the simulacrum of the philosopher -  the bad copy), who uses the same skills as the 
philosopher in search of profit or fame” (250). Simulacra operate on the principles of 
dissimilarity and subversion as opposed to copies that operate on the principles of 
similarity and complicity. It could be said that simulacra threaten the structure of the 
model in proposing a potential to make volatile and thus unstable the Platonic ontology. 
The threat that simulacra pose to the model would be one of instability in that they 
jeopardize the accuracy of representation -  simulacra haunt the mechanics of 
representation since the validity of the model itself comes in to question the instant a 
simulacrum is confused with a copy. It is in this sense that Deleuze will make the 
following remarks: “as a consequence of searching in the direction of the simulacrum and 
of leaning over its abyss, Plato discovers, in the flash of an instant, that the simulacrum is 
not simply a false copy, but that it places in question the very notations of copy and 
model” {Logic 256). It will be the radical potentiality of the simulacra, for Deleuze, that 
will mark his divergence from the Platonic model. In contrast, Baudrillard will collapse
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the triadic distinction of Idea-copy-simulacra in his third order of simulation. Where 
Deleuze will focus on the maximal difference posed by the simulacra, Baudrillard will 
focus on the maximal sameness posed by it. Both strategies depart from the Platonic 
model in divergent directions that are, however, still consistent in moving away from a 
representational ontology.
In response to the Platonic Idea-copy model Baudrillard will deploy his anti- 
representational concept of implosion, which is a structural force that sees the collapse of 
all poles of reference -  the structure of the Platonic formulation folds in on itself with the 
result of a collapse in the distance and hence distinctiveness of the Idea and the real. 
Implosion in the work of Baudrillard bears witness to the reign of the code in third order 
simulation that replaces the Platonic model, but unlike the latter in which the Idea 
espouses a traceable origin of authenticity by which all other copies are judged, the code 
erases all possibility o f an original and authentic frame of reference. The code is the end 
of representation. It precludes the possibility o f representation since signs lose 
distinctiveness. All signs are indeterminate in the code as Baudrillard makes clear; 
“Finality no longer belongs to the term; there is no longer a term, nor a determination. 
Finality is there beforehand, inscribed in the code” {Simulations 108-09). From the 
standpoint of the transcendent code, the process of signification always already issues 
through and from it so as to preclude not only the possibility of a space of representation 
but also the sense of ‘play’ in post-structuralism. The implications of Baudrillard’s re­
working of the Platonic ontology are clear: where degrees of similarity for copies and 
dissimilarity for simulacra constituted variance with regards to referential signification in 
the Platonic model, degrees of variation vanish (similarity and dissimilarity) in the reign
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of the code. All signifying elements are already accounted for within the anterior finality 
of the code. The resemblance of copies and the perversion of simulacra have no space in 
which to operate under the code’s regime, since, simply put, there is no longer a 
distinction to be made between that of copies and simulacra. All simulacra are copies, 
and vice versa. The code precludes the occurrence of actual change in that it already 
encapsulates all possible permutations of signification, which in turn leaves the entire 
system of reference weightless as only copies of copies of copies, based on a structurally 
of combinatorial modulation, issue from the code. As Massumi points out, “To the 
syntagmatic surface of slippage there corresponds an invisible paradigmatic dimension 
that creates those minimally differentiated signs only in order for them to blur together in 
a pleasureless orgy of exchange and circulation. Hidden in the images is a kind of 
genetic code responsible for their generation” (1). The minimally differentiated signs 
indeed exchange and circulate but only against and between themselves, which forms the 
syntagmatically closed circuit of the code. It is in this way that the code of Baudrillard’s 
third order of simulacra constitutes the transcendent term in simulation in that all (non) 
signifying terms operate according to a strict repetition of the same. Change only occurs 
at the level of the structurally of the structure of the code (Baudrillard’s theory of 
combinatorial modulation and cultural recycling as analyzed in chapter 1). Therefore, 
without the possibility of variance ever being introduced into the signs that issue from the 
code, signification endures a ceaseless repetition without difference. Here the code is 
seen as a totalizing structure in Baudrillard’s transcendent ontology of the hyperreal. All 
meaning is always already derivative of the totality of the structure of the code.
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Repetition of the same without difference defines the mechanics o f the totalizing 
structure of third order simulation. This type of repetition is seen in The Matrix in the 
example, from chapter one, of the simulated nature of Neo’s dual character. Both his 
illegal hacking operation and his legitimate programming job are indeterminate signs in 
the code of the matrix. Neither sign can be said to surpass a surface level o f signification 
since neither is more subversive or productive in terms of undermining or being complicit 
with the code. All meaning is always already trapped in the anterior finality o f the 
programmed matrix code. Indeed, Agent Smith’s file on Neo reveals clearly how he is 
already guilty o f every crime in the matrix world, but no action against Neo is necessary 
simply because none of his actions have a possibility o f undermining the functioning of 
the matrix -  in other words, his actions have no recourse to an external point of reference 
outside of the programming of the matrix. It is a perfectly transparent form of Bogart’s 
concept of simveillence. The counter example to the indeterminacy o f the code, as 
discussed in chapter one, is Neo’s encounter with the architect of the matrix, where, 
indeed, Neo chooses to pursue a particular action: he refuses the architect’s coercive 
arguments and risks the fate of humanity by choosing to not have his anomalous DNA 
reinserted into the matrix code. His decision forces change within the code; the failure of 
the code to anticipate every possible action or event in advance is shown. The matrix 
code ceases to exemplify the code of Baudrillard’s third order of simulacra since Neo’s 
action/decision proved to be outside o f the totality of the matrix programming, which is 
not possible during the reign of the code since meaning is indeterminate.
The indeterminacy of signification is another method through which it is possible 
to characterize the transcendent structure of Baudrillard’s third order of simulacra.
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Massumi describes the concept of indeterminacy and its effects on the individual and 
contemporary culture: “Both linear and dialectical causality no longer function, therefore 
everything is indetermination. The center o f meaning is empty, therefore we are satellites 
in lost orbit. We can no longer act like legislator-subjects or be passive like slaves, 
therefore we are sponges [. . .] A circuit has been created between the real and the 
imaginary, therefore reality has imploded into the undecidable proximity of hyperreality” 
(5-6). The idea of (in)determination is a key point through which Massumi contrasts 
Baudrillard’s and Deleuze’s versions o f the simulacrum and their effect on contemporary 
culture: whereas Baudrillard’s form of simulation cannot but espouse a nostalgic cynical 
lament qua its utter lack of determination and decidability in terms of depicting the 
hyperreal conditions of post-industrial society, Deleuze and Guattari’s work on 
simulation opposes fiitility in opening “a glimmer of possibility”. Massumi concludes on 
this contrast with the following point: “Against cynicism, a thin but fabulous hope -  of 
ourselves becoming realer than real in a monstrous contagion of our own making” (7). 
Before returning to the contrast between Baudrillard’s and Deleuze’s theory of 
simulation, I believe it is important to point out that Massumi’s critique of Baudrillard -  
his work lacking forms of resistance with which to oppose a world of hyperreality -  
omits the role of symbolic exchange. It is worthwhile, I believe, to give consideration to 
the role of symbolic exchange in Baudrillard’s theory of simulation since it is very much 
intended to provide a particular type of resistance. It is here, also, that I would like to 
return to Gordon’s claim (outlined in chapter one) regarding the Wachowskis’s 
misappropriation of Baudrillard.
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Arriving at a similar conclusion as Massumi does regarding the cynicism of 
Baudrillard’s theorization of the hyperreal, Gordon will claim that the Wachowskis either 
misunderstand or intentionally simplify the work of Baudrillard because unlike 
Baudrillard’s supposed pessimism that sees challenging hyperreality as a hopeless cause 
The Matrix provides a solution to the simulation problem (Gordon 100). Evidently, the 
conclusion to The Matrix trilogy is a victory for humanity in that they propose a peaceful 
coexistence with the machines of the matrix, and, thus, it can easily be seen as a 
moralising story of hope for humanity in challenging a dystopian future controlled by 
machines. It is altogether clear, however, that The Matrix trilogy, with the exception o f 
the brief moments o f simveillence and Neo’s dual character (as analyzed in chapter one), 
does not present a consolidated version of hyperreality, and therefore the conclusion 
drawn by Gordon regarding Baudrillard’s form of simulation as trapped both in cynicism 
and hopelessness is unfounded in that it relies on the inconsistent parallel between 
Baudrillard’s and the Wachowskis’s texts. The pessimism assertion in Gordon’s reading 
of Baudrillard, I believe, remains misguided even if  considered on its own -  apart from 
the inconsistency of the parallel between Baudrillard and the Wachowskis. Gordon’s 
critique of Baudrillard maintains a degree of superficiality in that it fails to include a 
discussion of symbolic exchange. The error of making such an omission is made 
apparent by Genosko who outlines the significance of symbolic exchange as the key 
counter-point to simulation: “Baudrillard has taken the semiological principle that all 
value issues from the code and turned it into a nightmarish principle in which everything 
appears to be written in advance (hence the precession of simulacra); all signals are 
suspended in matrices embedded in codes. Symbolic exchange is Baudrillard’s answer to
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whether or not there remains any hope of opposition” (Genosko, “Baudrillard” 33). It is 
precisely this answer of symbolic exchange, as Genosko points out, that is integral to any 
non-reductive discussion of whether or not resistance is a veritable possibility in the work 
of Baudrillard -  this point becomes increasingly important when contrasting Baudrillard 
to Deleuze, which I will return to after a discussion of symbolic exchange. That 
Baudrillard is morally ambivalent or even proclaiming a nihilistic vision of contemporary 
culture is an all too easy and far too prevalent conclusion reached by contemporary critics 
-  both Hegarty’s insightful analysis o f this phenomenon as well as the Matrix critics 
discussed in chapter one are worth recalling. To avoid an unwarranted and superficial 
dismissal of Baudrillard’s work, symbolic exchange has to bear some critical weight with 
regards to analyzing and applying the concept of simulation since quite clearly much of 
Baudrillard’s early work is devoted to an analysis of the varying modes of symbolic 
exchange that by definition stand in contrast to simulation.** The relevant question qua 
resistance, if it is to be posed, is one that scrutinizes the concept o f symbolic exchange as 
a response to simulation in the effort o f diagnosing how it challenges the structure of 
hyperreality and, more importantly, whether or not it constitutes a veritable challenge to 
the totality o f simulated reality.
Symbolic exchange, for Baudrillard, serves as a counter-point to simulation in 
that it is a chaotic force capable of interrupting, however briefly, the closed-circuitry of 
third order simulation. The sources to which symbolic exchange is indebted are critical 
to an understanding of the function of the concept. It is partly based on the socio- 
anthropological work of Marcel Mauss, for whom the theory of gift-exchange was
Hegarty provides a comprehensive outline of the way in which symbolic exchange develops in the work 
of Baudrillard from its early traces in Consumer Society to its most developed form in Symbolic Exchange 
and Death (Hegarty 34-9).
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essential to the analysis o f the potlatch practices, the Kula, of the people of the Trobriand 
Islands. The concept of symbolic exchange is also indebted to Georges Bataille’s work 
The Accursed Share, which further theorizes the concept of gift-exchange in Mauss’s The 
Gift. The gift, for Mauss, is evidence of an extra-material dimension of an economy that 
precedes the development of the barter system, and the later economics of mercantilism 
and capitalism. This is a particularly significant point for Baudrillard given that the 
precession of simulacra are historically contingent and as such develop according to the 
socio-economic mutations o f western culture, as I have discussed in chapter one. Of 
central importance to the function o f the gift is that it serves as a vehicle through which 
one acquires or loses social status (prestige, honour, and rank) through the reciprocal 
obligation that binds thé gift giver and gift receiver (and gift returnee) into the following 
circuitry: to give, to receive, and to return with interest. Again, the importance of this 
type of reciprocity is situated in its extra-material dimension that functions 
asymmetrically in (non-) relation to normalized economic practices. Hegarty explains 
this point as follows:
We have forgotten giff-economies, as exemplified in the potlatch. This is an 
adversarial form of gift-giving where to give creates an obligation to receive and 
also return the gift. This returned gift must be bigger and better than the first, and 
can even extend to the destruction of your own offering. There can be no 
equivalent to modem property in such a system, and all exchange takes place in 
the context of religious, political, ritual, social interaction, as none of these has yet 
acquired an autonomous existence. (34)
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The extra-material dimension of the gift, as Hegarty shows, is an autonomous sphere that 
collects its power as a force of resistance since it is foreign to dominant modes of 
signification in the practices of economics, politics, and culture. This dimension of the 
gift is laden with further significance in the work of Bataille. As Bataille makes clear, the 
circulation of the gift can not be reduced to an act of acquisition alone:
It would be futile, as a matter of fact, to consider the economic aspects o f potlatch 
without first having formulated the viewpoint defined by general economy. There 
would be no potlatch if, in a general sense, the ultimate problem concerned the 
acquisition and not the dissipation of useful wealth. (68)
For Bataille, the general economy is defined by the perpetual expenditure of energy that 
works outside o f modem economic practices where production is overly dependant on 
consumption. The perfect example of such pure expenditure is found in the concept of 
solarity where life organizes itself around the sun’s absolute disbursement of energy. To 
paraphrase Bataille, the sun radiates and dispenses energy without receiving any in retum 
(28). As Hegarty explains, pure expenditure for society in the general economy of 
Bataille translates to sacrificial and wasteful acts: “Bataille extends this theory to 
sacrifice, arguing that the fundamental principle of the universe consists of waste, 
destruction, death, eroticism and transgression, rather than tmth, wealth, security. There 
must always be an ‘accursed share’ to keep the system going” (34). Again, the general 
economy has to be read as an event occurring outside of modem economic systems. It is 
a wasteful event -  for example a destmction of useful goods -  that functions beyond the 
principles of productivity and utilitarianism. It is the aspects of obligatory reciprocity in
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Mauss and the destruction of wealth in Bataille that forms the extra-material dimension 
of the gift that Baudrillard will look to as the counter point to simulation.
Reciprocal obligation and sacrifice, for Baudrillard, constitute the key concepts 
behind symbolic exchange through which the world of simulacra can be interrupted, 
reversed, or even cancelled. Genosko summarizes a picture of hyperreal society: “In the 
order o f simulation, general connectivity rules the day, and in this new kind of 
postperspectival space, there has been a complete loss of critical distance that would 
allow for a distinction between the real and its models. And this entails the 
transfiguration of the real into the simulacral” (“Baudrillard” 33). Against the closed- 
circuitry of the reign of the code where, as Genosko points out, simulation precludes 
recourse to a space o f critical distance (the foundation of resistance and representation) 
through the loss o f individual and collective perspective, symbolic exchange re­
introduces a perspective outside of the confines of simulation through which a critical 
distance is achieved in the reciprocity found in the extra-material dimension of symbolic 
exchange. The determinacy o f symbolic exchange, its reciprocal obligation, and acts of 
destruction interrupt the closed circuitry o f the hyperreal where social relations had 
hitherto been indeterminate and passive, lacking in perspective and critical distance.
Although highly controversial, Baudrillard’s most recent example of symbolic 
exchange occurred during his response to the event of September 11*, 2001. In this 
event it was the power of the counter-gift that introduced reversibility and challenge to 
the closed circuit logic of post-industrial economics. Genosko explains how the twin 
towers, in the 1970s writing of Baudrillard, constituted the “divine form of simulation” 
where “competition and referentiality were eclipsed by correlation and replication: The
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twin towers are signs of closure and redoubling, not o f a system that can still surpass 
itself with original edifices. The twinness of the towers remain for Baudrillard the 
‘perfect embodiment’ of today’s world order” (“Spirit” 34). It is this form of binary logic 
that signals the dominance of hegemonic global capitalism. The two suicide planes that 
embedded themselves in the towers gave a gift of destruction and waste to the closed- 
circuit of global capitalism. The dominance of the logic of hegemonic capitalism was 
interrupted so that the twin towers were forced to respond in kind; to commit suicide.
The destructive gift of the planes is further explicated by Genosko: “What made suicide 
subversive and, in reverse, made all subversion suicidal, was that it escaped the 
monopolistic control over death exercised by contemporary societies o f simulation 
through their sanctioned institutions (which prohibit suicide and either try to exclude 
symbolic relations or simulate them)” (“Spirit” 34). The destructive gift of the suicide 
planes in turn forced the twin towers into symbolic relations: they responded in kind and 
with interest by collapsing, committing suicide themselves. Herein lies the power o f the 
extra-material dimension of symbolic exchange in releasing forces capable of overturning 
the hegemony of hyperreality. It is important to point out that the response of the twin 
towers (to respond in kind with suicide) is not a real phenomenon. In his response to the 
9/11 event Baudrillard carefully phrases the response of the towers through an “as i f ’ 
conditionality. Genosko makes clear the importance of this conditionality in the work of 
Baudrillard:
[Symbolic Exchange] is beyond the real/imaginary distinction, beyond all 
disjunctions and separations and splittings that follow from the irreversibility and 
individuality of death against life, the fascination with which it brings to an end.
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but in the unnerving modality of ‘as though/if : the twin towers collapsed by 
themselves as though in a response in kind to the challenge of the suicide planes. 
In a nutshell: disjunctivity with any content is shattered by acts of symbolic 
exchange because it takes away the ability to separate the terms in a structure in 
which each term is the imaginary o f the other (the real is thus an effect of all such 
disjunctions). (“Spirit” 98-99)
It is in this way that symbolic exchange does not occur in what is considered the real. 
Symbolic exchange, as Genosko clarifies, plays at the level o f forms in such a way that it 
can not be reduced to a simple disjunction of terms such as the separation of the terms of 
life and death since such a separation would result in a reification of that very disjunction 
in what Genosko analyzes as the effect o f the real (“Spirit” 99). Symbolic exchange, 
instead, is a process of reversibility whereby each term is returned to the other that was 
hitherto excluded in the effectuation of the real -  it is a conjunction or connection and not 
a disjunction or separation. Here the power of symbolic exchange is seen most clearly in 
the way in which it volatilizes a simulated structure -  its reversibility forces an 
interruption in the closed-circuitry of simulation by forcing a connectivity of excluded 
terms. The monopoly on life and productivity in the structure of global economics is 
interrupted by the forced movement of the wasteful destruction of goods (death and 
sacrifice). Symbolic exchange forces the hegemonic structure of global economics to 
recognize death, which in the case of the event of 9/11, according to Baudrillard, resulted 
in the towers committing suicide as i f  they were returning the gift of death with interest.
It follows that symbolic exchange has to be recognized as a potential form of 
resistance in the work of Baudrillard, even though it never acts as a real phenomena. It is
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always deployed through the modality o f as if/though, but in doing so it forces 
hegemonic systems to recognize previously excluded terms -  unproductive acts of death 
such as destruction and suicide. They are acts of violence that operate according to a 
principle of loss as opposed to accumulation and profitability. Importantly, Hegarty 
notes that symbolic exchange is not intended to serve the role of engendering 
revolutionary practices.*^ Although symbolic exchange does not constitute a developed 
theory of revolutionary resistance, it nevertheless remains a viable form of possible 
resistance in its momentary potential o f overturning overly codified systems (societies of 
simulation). It is for this reason, I believe, that Baudrillard’s work can not be singularly 
termed as a cynical work that is devoid of a counter-point to simulation in appearing 
always already totalizing. Such a conclusion, as is the case with Gordon’s and 
Massumi’s analyses, can only be reached by excluding the concept of symbolic 
exchange. Baudrillard’s description of hyperreal societies does not endorse hopelessness, 
since symbolic exchange evidently has a radical power to reverse the directionality o f 
hegemonic systems.
To retum to the contrast of the Baudrillardian and Deleuzian concepts of 
simulation, I believe that Massumi is quite correct in seeing the later as opening a radical 
space of resistance, change, and hope. Still, an argument concerning a form of radical 
resistance to totalizing systems in Deleuze need not be formulated in contra-distinction to 
Baudrillard. As I have shown in the above analysis, a contrast between both theories can 
not be formulated within a simple equation that would have Baudrillard’s simulacrum as
Quoting from the Mirror o f  Production, Hegarty shows how symbolic exchange is inconsistent with 
forms of revolution, since symbolic forces are always about loss and not accumulation: “There is no 
suggestion of a process of an increase in ‘symbolic’ acts of violence (in terms of spectacle, for example) 
which will usher in a benevolent, unified society where symbolic exchange is the norm, as ‘[this utopian 
violence does not accumulate; it is lost.’ It is sacrificial, not beneficial” (Hegarty 38).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
65
hopeless and vice versa in the case of Deleuze. Such a formulation o f the contrast 
between the versions of simulation is necessarily superficial in prioritizing Deleuze’s 
theory over that of Baudrillard’s through the omission of symbolic exchange. A well- 
founded claim could be made, I believe, regarding Deleuze’s version of simulation as 
providing a more veritable form of resistance than Baudrillard’s, but such a claim 
nevertheless would have to account for the role of symbolic exchange as a form of 
resistance in the work of Baudrillard. Although I do not intend to pursue this line of 
argument in this thesis, I believe it is important to point out that an argument following 
up on the relative value of resistance to hegemonic structures in the works of Deleuze and 
Baudrillard would certainly be more nuanced than the simple outline I have provided 
here. Such an argument could be contextualized in a transcendent/immanent distinction, 
which I will use to contrast the two versions of simulation. Before continuing on to an 
explication of Deleuze’s concept of the simulacrum, I would like to show briefly the way 
in which symbolic exchange figures into what I have shown as Baudrillard’s transcendent 
term of simulation. I showed above that Baudrillard’s theory of simulation is 
transcendent in that the code disallows variance in its structurality due to the fact that 
signification always already issues fi-om it as the same without difference. Since 
symbolic exchange has the power of reversibility when dealing with the hegemonic 
structure of the code of third order simulacra and that it functions as a brief and, perhaps, 
spontaneous interruption, it follows that symbolic forces could be seen as functioning 
immanently to the transcendent structure of simulation. Indeed, the dimension of the 
symbolic never overturns the system entirely and instead acts as a brief interruption of 
antagonistic violence. Also, as mentioned above, symbolic exchange is not a systematic
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form of resistance that could be utilized on a mass scale for revolutionary purposes. The 
extra-material dimension of symbolic exchange -  the way in which it originates outside 
of both archaic and modern forms of economics and, thus, offers the most radical 
possibility of loss in opposition to accumulation -  positions it in the work of Baudrillard, 
as Hegarty states, as a form o f ‘differance’; “It is always beyond, and constitutes a 
privileged, if always already constituted. Other” (37). In the function o f Other beyond 
the confines of simulation, symbolic exchange serves the role of supplement to the 
structurality of the structure of simulation as a displaced or deferred center. The 
reversibility of terms brought about through symbolic forces precisely supplements 
simulation with the terms it had hitherto excluded so as to become a totalizing structure 
of simulation. To reverse simulation momentarily is to force upon it the excluded form 
of death as Other to life, loss as Other to accumulation. In short, the totality o f simulation 
therefore depends upon the exclusion of non-productive elements -  it relegates 
uncontrollable (non) values to the symbolic dimension. Simulation could not occur 
without its deferred center: symbolic exchange. It follows that Baudrillard’s work on 
simulation is transcendent, since the transcendent structure of the code (encoding all 
meaning in advance) is necessarily linked to the transcendent forces of symbolic 
exchange (introducing uncoded meaning into the code). It could then be concluded that 
Baudrillard’s early texts up to and including Simulations operate in the space in between 
the transcendent terms of simulation and symbolic exchange.
For Deleuze, like Baudrillard, the concept of the simulacrum is indebted to the 
Platonic formulation of the model-copy-simulacrum. The issue of representation is also 
at stake in Deleuze’s reworking of the Platonic model. Unlike Baudrillard, however, who
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deploys his concept of implosion in order to collapse the distinction of the copy and 
simulacrum that in turn engulfs the mechanics of representation within the code of third 
order simulation, the task that Deleuze sets before him is to unhinge or, rather, to show 
how simulacra have always worked from the outside of a representational context, which 
is to say that simulacra work asymmetrically to the Platonic model. As Claire Colebrook 
explains, value only arises in Baudrillard to the extent to which something has been 
copied, whereas for Deleuze every copy has a different value according to its actual and 
original being (98). More specifically, the world is replete with simulacra for Baudrillard 
and they derive value only insofar as they issue from the code of third order simulation, 
but for Deleuze although the world is also replete with simulacra, each has a distinct and 
authentic value that is not derivative o f a transcendent term such as the Baudrillardian 
code or the Platonic model. It is in this way that Baudrillard will substitute the code for 
the Platonic model and Deleuze will dispose of the model altogether or show how 
simulacra are Other to it. The transcendent term of the code ensures that value arises 
according to a repetition of the same, whereas simulacra, for Deleuze, always show a 
repetition of maximal difference. As Roffe notes, Deleuzian simulacra have the task o f 
affirming, not copying, “a world populated by differences-in-themselves which are not 
copies of any prior model” (250). Roffe further concludes that because the simulacrum 
does not rely upon a model but rather makes up the world through its own force that it is:
... able to do things and not merely represent. It is as a result of this positive 
power that simulacra can produce identities from within the world, and without 
reference to a model, by entering into concrete relations -  in this case, the 
philosopher is not the one searching for the Good, but the one who is able to
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create new concepts from the material available in the world; concepts which will 
do something. (250-51)
That simulacra have the positive power o f affirming materials in the world without 
reference to a representational model is the way in which Deleuze will move towards an 
immanent ontology that is opposed to both the Platonic and Baudrillardian transcendent 
ones.
It is in appendix one of The Logic o f Sense, “The Simulacrum and Ancient 
Philosophy”, that Deleuze will explicate the simulacrum according to immanent 
principles. In this text he reads Plato against Plato in posing the following question;
“Was it not Plato himself who pointed out the direction for the reversal o f Platonism?” 
(256). The reversal of Platonism, for Deleuze, was already immanently at work in 
Plato’s representational model due to the way in which simulacra had to be repressed in 
order for copies to be judged within the context of the model. The platonic motivation, 
he writes;
has to do with selecting among the pretenders, distinguishing the good and bad 
copies or, rather, copies (always well-founded) and simulacra (always engulfed in 
dissimilarity). It is a question of assuring the triumph of the copies over 
simulacra, of repressing simulacra, keeping them completely submerged, 
preventing them from climbing to the surface, and ‘insinuating themselves’ 
everywhere. (257)
Simulacra have false pretensions in representing the inherent qualities o f the Idea in that 
unlike copies they are not well-founded pretenders that espouse an essential and internal 
resemblance to the model. They are false pretenders that are based on an essential and
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internal deviation to the model and as such they threaten to undermine the values o f the 
Platonic model. The reversal of Platonism occurs when the threat of simulacra is realized 
in their potential to upset the ability o f the Platonic model to distinguish between essence 
and appearance. Idea and image, and original and copy (256). Such distinctions are 
presupposed to be transparent in the model since copies, unlike simulacra, are guaranteed 
to derive value secondarily from the transcendent term of the Idea, which is to say that 
transparency is maintained by order in the Platonic model. Copies are ordered according 
to a repetition of the same in that they always derive value secondarily from the model. 
Simulacra, on the other hand, could be said in this context to operate chaotically since 
they insinuate themselves everywhere according to a repetition with maximal difference; 
that is, they do not pass through a transcendent term so as to acquire meaning but rather 
already have a positive meaning qua their being. This is to say that their being is not 
dependant on external objects in that operating asymmetrically to a model or code they 
are already asignifying elements from the standpoint of a transcendent structure. The 
transparency of the model is always jeopardized by the simulacrum since they are proof, 
as Deleuze states, of an internal unbalance: “That to which they pretend (the object, the 
quality, etc.), they pretend to underhandedly, under cover of an aggression, an 
insinuation, a subversion, ‘against the father’, and without passing through the Idea. 
Theirs is an unfounded pretension, concealing a dissimilarity which is an internal 
unbalance” (257). It is this internal unbalance that is expressed by the radical power o f 
simulacra. Their being for-themselves (Other to any system of reference) espouses the 
primary power of the production of positive identities. In short, the reversal o f Platonism 
occurs when simulacra are no longer repressed so that resemblance is constituted by
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internalized difference and not sameness, and where identity is constituted as a primary 
power of difference and not a derivative value (262).
Simulacra, unlike copies, each possess an internally differentiating power of 
identity formation, albeit one that is never static but one that is also fluctuating in the 
creation of fiarther differentiating identities. They do not repeat the same or the similar 
since, for Deleuze, there exists no authenticity other than the difference in-itself of 
simulacra. Their force is a primary one that expresses identity through a repetition of the 
different -  not just a play of different forms, but of the creation of self-differentiating 
substances. In this way they act immanently in and of the world. Nonsense, is 
Baudrillard’s response:
Theoretical production, like material production, loses its determinacy and begins 
to turn around itself, slipping abysmally [en abyme\ towards a reality that cannot 
be found. This is where we are today; undecidability, the era offloating theories, 
as much as floating money. No matter what perspective they come from (the 
psychoanalytic included), no matter with what violence they struggle and claim to 
rediscover an immanence, or a movement without systems of reference (Deleuze, 
Lyotard, etc.), all contemporary theories are floating and have no meaning other 
than to serve as signs for one another. It is pointless to insist on their coherence 
with some ‘reality’, whatever that might be. The system has removed every secure 
reference from theory as it has from any other labour power. Theory no longer has 
any use-value, the theoretical mirror o f production has also cracked. So much the 
better. What I mean is that the very undecidability of theory is an effect of the 
code. {Symbolic Exchange 44)
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Baudrillard here claims that ontological philosophies that intend to explain object- 
subject relations in immanent terms, without recourse to external systems of reference, 
are tautological qua their necessary dependence -  whether explicit or implicit -  on 
negative difference as mode of signification, which is to say that such theories only 
acquire relative value within or amongst themselves. To produce theory is to simulate 
reality. To affirm the difference for-itself of the simulacrum, as Deleuze does, is an 
incoherent example for Baudrillard since simulation is resistant to theories that would 
formulate a determined connectivity between reality and, as it were, an external concept- 
object. Labour power as well as theory lack concrete reference points from where it 
would be possible to achieve a critical distance -  or any form of distance required for 
either representation and/or identity formation. Since simulation has eclipsed 
representation there is no longer a space or a distance from which point a theorist could 
achieve a critical perspective in developing an ontological philosophy based on immanent 
principles. The fabric of social and philosophical referentiality is tom asunder, leaving a 
world of indeterminate meanings.
The Deleuzian response to Baudrillard’s critique would highlight the importance 
of the terms “virtual” and “actual” and how they function differently in the transcendent 
and immanent philosophies of Baudrillard and Deleuze. Colebrook for instance will 
formulate the virtual and actual distinction in Baudrillard as follows:
The postmodern world is caught up in television, advertising, copies of designer 
goods, cloning, the meaningless repetition of brand-names and computer 
simulations of just about everything. Whether we celebrate or lament this world, 
we nevertheless describe it through a distinction between the actual and the
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virtual: there was once a time when we were close to reality (which is actual) and 
now all we have are images (the virtual). This is why, following contemporary 
thinkers like Jean Baudrillard, postmodern culture has been described as a society 
o f ‘simulacra.’ (97)
According to Colebrook’s analysis of Baudrillard, the term “actual” is aligned with 
reality whereas the term “virtual” is aligned with the image/simulacrum. It is the 
production of virtual images issuing from the code that eclipses the referentiality of the 
actual. It is the historical process o f the precession of the simulacra that Colebrook here 
seems to be referring to. However, it is not clear whether Colebrook refers directly to the 
work of Baudrillard, or whether she is making a statement about the reception of his ideas 
in a postmodern context. The difference being that although a separation between the 
terms “virtual” and “actual” can be seen in types of postmodemisms*^, for Baudrillard 
such a separation can not exist in third order simulation. In third order simulation all 
distinctions, including that of the virtual and actual, collapse as a result o f the implosive 
forces at work in the transition from second order simulacra to that of the third. 
Nevertheless, both conclusions on Baudrillard equate to relatively the same conclusions 
in contrast to Deleuze s formulation of the virtual/actual. Colebrook’s point is that 
whereas there exists a clear separation of the terms in postmodernism, and I would add 
that no separation exists between the terms for Baudrillard, there exists a significant
” Here one could refer to Jameson’s work Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic o f  Late Capitalism where 
there, indeed, exists at least instances of a separation of the terms “virtual” and “actual”. One element of 
his periodization of postmodernism, for example, entails a forgetting of historical factors. This is in part 
due to the fragmentation of the individual, and the lack of a concrete or “actual” individuahty in 
postmodernism -  the analysis of Edward Munch’s “The Scream” drives this point home. Other instances of 
the separation of the virtual and actual can be seen in the overly commercialized thematics Jameson reads 
in the work of Andy ’Warhol. It is a type of art exemplary of postmodernism in that it sees the emergence 
of a “depthlessness” and a “superficiality”. These two examples can be likened to Colebrook’s position on 
the postmodern in that only virtual images circulate without reference to actual existences.
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connectivity between the terms for Deleuze. For example, when Baudrillard claims that 
“[t]heory no longer has any use-value,” {Symbolic Exchange 44) he is really saying that 
there is no longer an actual point of reference through which to ground concepts in a 
reality principle. Thus for Baudrillard, all contemporary theories float weightless (as 
imploded virtual/actual signs) and only gain value through exchanging against one 
another -  they are simulacra of one another removed from the possibility of making a 
distinction between the actual and virtual. In contrast, there exists a connectivity of the 
actual-virtual for Deleuze since the becoming of something real and identifiable is linked 
with an intensive process. A key example is Zeno’s paradox that if the trajectory of the 
arrow is divided along discrete points in time-space it would never achieve its target. 
When the flight of the arrow is divided into discrete moments, those moments proliferate 
exponentially and thus mapping the flight of the arrow becomes an infinite exercise. The 
process of something becoming actualized is not reducible to representation. Its flight as 
well as its actualized impact on the target is actual/virtual. Deleuze will therefore insist 
that the real is always constituted simultaneously by both the actual and virtual. 
Colebrook lists two reasons why this is the case for Deleuze; 1) everything actual to 
begin with is already an image being produced by virtual potentials; and 2) the actual can 
not be reduced to just an effect of the virtual, but instead everything actual contains 
within itself a virtual power to become something else (Colebrook 98). Such a definition 
of the virtual in Deleuze’s philosophy has to be seen as something radically different than 
virtual reality. VR is an effect of an already actualized world in that it is a representation 
of a possibility of an already realized state. Here the example of the holodeck in Star 
Trek’s Enterprise series is a good example of VR. Although the images presented in the
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holodeck may differ from reality, they are nevertheless based on what it differs from.
The episodes where Moriarty takes control of the Enterprise, which in effect reverses the 
fact that he had always been defeated by Holmes, are based on possibilities extracted 
from an already actualized world. Deleuze’s concept of virtuality, on the other hand, 
precedes the knowable or intelligible. Constantine V. Boundas states the distinction 
between the possible and the virtual as such:
Now, tendencies are real, not merely possible. They have the reality o f the virtual 
which exists in order to be actualized. A virtual X is something which, without 
being or resembling X, has nonetheless the efficiency (the virtus) o f producing X. 
In opposition to the virtual, the possible has no reality, whereas the virtual, 
without being actual, is real. (86)
For Deleuze, the possible exists in opposition to the virtual. Also, the possible here has 
to be contrasted with the potential for or the tendency of X becoming X. The possible is 
dependant on the real and in that way represents a varying state of the real. In contrast, 
the virtual is part of the intensive process by which something is actualized. It is a 
difference here of being-for-another and becoming-for-itself. It is thus beyond the field 
of representation for if it were otherwise Zeno’s arrow, again, would not reach its target. 
The forces of the actual and the virtual have to be seen within the context o f a continual 
engagement (an intensive process), always playing against and off one another. This is 
why the simulacrum is never static, but rather always in the process of becoming, of 
being different, and of changing what constitutes its nature as well as what constitutes its 
appearance. Its appearance and meanings are therefore always in flux.
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Such continuously changing states in the world are partly accounted for by 
simulacra in Deleuze’s ontology. This is because the simulacrum for Deleuze is a 
difference-machine. Unlike the Platonic formulation that represents elements in the 
world according to the model’s principles of the same and the similar where a copy’s 
derivate value is acquired through the Idea, and unlike the Baudrillardian formulation that 
also works (but does not represent) according to the code’s principles of the repetition of 
the same where a copy’s derivate value is acquired through the code, the Deleuzian one 
functions as a difference-machine without reference to a model or code where a copy’s 
value is chiefly found in its positive power to become-other. To become-other is an 
intensive process that is not derivate of any model that anchors either identity or the 
horizon of thought in pre-formulated terms. Becoming is a process o f a repetition of 
maximal difference. Deleuze explains how the repetition of the same and similar vary 
from his conception of the simulacrum:
That the Same and the Similar may be simulated does not mean that they are 
appearances or illusions. Simulation designates the power of producing an effect. 
But this is not intended only in a causal sense, since causality would remain 
completely hypothetical and indeterminate without the intervention of other 
meanings. It is intended rather in the sense of a ‘sign’ issued from a process of 
signalization; it is in the sense of a ‘costume,’ or rather a mask, expressing a 
process of disguising, where, behind each mask, there is yet another ... (Logic 
263).
The simulacrum is not dependant on causality, which is to say that it does not find 
meaning in already formulated notions of identity and thought. Rather, it produces
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difference along a curvature. The effect of such difference is seen in the appearance of a 
particular simulacrum, but can never be reduced to such appearance since as Deleuze 
notes there always exists another mask behind the mask of appearance. This is precisely 
what characterizes the intensive process of becoming in simulacra; that is, what 
constitutes the simulacrum as a difference-machine.
The importance Deleuze attributes to subterranean networks of masks folding 
upon further masks is in general what he sees as the affinity between simulacra and 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept o f eternal recurrence. Deleuze notes the importance of this 
connection as follows:
Between the eternal return and the simulacrum, there is such a profound link that 
the one cannot be understood except through the other. Only the divergent series, 
insofar as they are divergent, return: that is, each series insofar as it displaces its 
difference along with all the others, and all series insofar as they complicate their 
difference within the chaos which is without beginning or end. The circle of the 
eternal return is a circle which is always ex-centric in relation to an always 
decentred center. (264)
Part three of The Matrix trilogy begins with Neo being stuck in the subway station 
“Mobil Ave.”, which is explained by the oracle as a vehicle through which the 
Merovingian program smuggles things into and out of the matrix program from the 
machine world. The Trainman is the one who constructed the station and is the only one 
who can conduct subway cars into and out of “Mobil Ave”. The particular subway car he 
does conduct to this station has its destination marked as “Loop”. When the Trainman 
refuses to grant Neo transport back into the matrix, it is here that Neo runs into the
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subway tunnel only to find out that he returns to precisely the same space fi'om where he 
began. The profound link between the simulacrum and eternal recurrence, as Deleuze 
notes, could not be more explicit in this example. In Part three section two of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra the depiction of the Moment Gateway is made:
“Behold,” I continued, “this moment! From this gateway. Moment, a long eternal 
lane leads backward: behind us lies an eternity. Must not whatever can walk have 
walked on this lane before? Must not whatever can have happened, have been 
done, have passed by before? ... And return and walk in that other lane, out there, 
before us, in this long dreadful lane-must we not eternally return?” (270)
For Deleuze what returns is only that which makes difference. For Plato, according 
Deleuze, it is only the Same and the Similar which returns and it is the different -  the 
simulacrum -  that is repressed and '''made not to return” (Deleuze, Logic 265). Indeed, 
simulacra are not made to return since they are the element which threatens to undermine 
the system upon which resemblance (representation) is guaranteed; that is, as Deleuze 
argues, repressing simulacra by making them not return is a process that “pretends to 
correct divergence, to recenter the circles or order the chaos, and to provide a model or 
make a copy” (265). If a Deleuzian version of simulacra is to be found in The Matrix 
trilogy, then it will occupy a space of resembling the unmatched and of a repetition -  a 
recurrence -  of the difference: the simulacrum as difference-machine.
How does the difference-machine, Deleuze’s simulacrum, apply to The Matrix 
trilogy? To put the concept to work in the context of the film trilogy, I will return to an 
example I used frequently in chapter one. In chapter one I used the scene from The 
Matrix Reloaded that showed the conversation between the architect and Neo as an
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example that indicated the implausibility of applying Baudrillard’s third order of 
simulation to that particular moment in the film trilogy. This was due to the fact that Neo 
chose to resist the pseudo-Freud’s coercive arguments of having his anomalous DNA 
reinserted into the code of the matrix. Such choice evidently does not exist in 
Baudrillard’s reign of the code since all meaning is indeterminate and formulated in 
advance. This example fi'om The Matrix Reloaded offers a different trajectory of 
interpretation when Deleuzian criteria qua the simulacrum are applied to it as opposed to 
those of Baudrillard’s. The architect’s control room makes for a curious backdrop for the 
scene. What makes it curious is its semi-spherical shape that is technologized through a 
series of interconnected TV screens only interrupted by two doors on either side of the 
room. Is it the panoptic observation space of the matrix alluded to in the first Matrix by 
the TV screens through which the interrogation of Neo scene is foregrounded? With the 
click of the architect’s wireless remote pen, the screens come alive with images of Neo. 
They display a magnitude of images of Neo doing and saying things in three distinct 
series, with each image series always corresponding to a single response made by the real 
Neo. The images ask questions, state exclamations, or show gestures in the three series: 
“Others? / How Many? / What others? Answer my question!”, shortly later “Liar! / 
Bullshit! / Ahahaha [laughter] / Five before me?”, and finally “You can’t control me / I’m 
gonna smash you to bits / You can’t make me do anything” (The Matrix Reloaded). The 
images ask questions and state exclamations, revealing, presumably, what is intended to 
represent the different possible directions that Neo’s identity could have taken. The 
emotional range of responses varies from inquisitive innocence, to explosive anger, and 
impertinent laughter, whereas the rhetorical strategies and use o f language range from
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rational questioning, to volatile profanity, and imperative demanding. Additionally, there 
are images that, although they do not speak, raise a fist or the middle finger at the 
architect, or that look completely appalled. The magnitude of Neo-images display 
varying responses to the architect’s explanation that this is the sixth version of the matrix 
program and that he is the sixth version of the ‘one’ who carries the anomalous DNA that 
supplements the unbalanced equation of the code. Are these images exemplary of the 
virtual dimension? Do they constitute simulacra?
This example would seemingly lend itself to a reading of Deleuze’s simulacrum 
in that we could consider the variety o f  other possible directions along which Neo’s 
identity could have been formed during his conversation with the architect. According to 
such a reading, this scene would show that the images are simulacra, that they are all 
subterranean caverns or masks existing behind the actualized Neo. If Neo is a 
simulacrum in this scene, then it is plausible to consider that his identity is not static and 
that multiple potentialities exist such as abruptly terminating his conversation with the 
architect by giving him the middle finger or smashing him to bits (is that possible?). This 
reading, however, does not work since the images hinge on possibilities and not 
virtualities. They are not part of the intensive process of Neo’s becoming, which they 
would have to be in order to be considered simulacra. What makes the images 
possibilities and not virtualities is the fact that they are anchored in Neo’s actu 
responses. At the conclusion of the first series of images the actual Neo rerna aim 
and almost reticent in his silence. At the conclusion of the second one he offers a rational 
explanation of why he was unaware of there being five versions of the matrix program 
that preceded him; “There are only two possiblo explanations, either no one told me or no
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one knows”. And to the final series there corresponds Neo’s pseudo-prophetic 
conclusion about the problem of choice inherent in the programming of the matrix code: 
“Choice. The problem is choice”. To the excessive gestures and actions of the images 
there corresponds a composed and logical Neo who concludes each series. It is this 
identity that constitutes Neo. We could still claim that Neo’s identity is not a static one 
because of the possibilities proposed by the images. And this would be coherent with 
Deleuze’s theory of simulation in that beings/things are always in the process o f 
becoming. However, the images represent possibilities that did not occur as evidenced 
by Neo’s actual response. Even though in the film the images temporally precede Neo’s 
actual response, they only become intelligible in light of the actual responses. And it is in 
this context that they have to be seen as effects and not affects. In other words, the 
images themselves do not occupy an active space within the intensive process o f the 
becoming of Neo; they do not affect the change of his identity. The images instead point 
to discrete phases and gestures in time/space that occur as a result o f the identity Neo 
already achieves; they are effects of his already changed identity.
What makes the images of Neo worth considering further, however, is that they 
are not merely possibilities, but actualized possibilities of Neo’s character that get played 
out on the architect’s screens. It is because of this reason that they could be seen as 
simulacra themselves were it not, again, for the fact that they are anchored in the realness 
of Neo; that is, they offer possibilities of Neo’s character, but they do not stand on their 
own since they are comprehensible only as a reflection of Neo’s comments. To use 
Zeno’s paradox once again, if Neo’s identity is in the process of becoming-other, then to 
identify discretely the points through which his identity takes flight would be an
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indefinite task. The images are distinctly not part o f the process o f his becoming; they 
are ordered into three separate series and they are structured according to when Neo is 
about to speak. If it was possible to represent Neo’s process of becoming, then the film 
would stall at that very moment in the hopeless task of attempting to identify the infinite 
points through which Neo’s identity takes flight in the process of becoming-other.
Instead, it seems as if the images represent the fictional psychological process of Neo as 
he converses with the architect. It is the hot-tempered and excessive emotional urges 
represented by the images that Neo represses and through which he subsequently arrives 
at his cool and rational responses to the architect. Or, perhaps they are intended to 
represent Neo’s unconscious as analyzed by the architect, because they are very much 
controlled by the pseudo-Freud’s computerized pen with which he can turn on and off the 
screens and, thus, images by extension. Either way, they find meaning only through the 
real Neo’s speech and action. As such, they are indicative of the possible and not the 
virtual. Boundas explains how the process of actualization differs for the possible and 
the virtual;
The possible resembles and represents the real. As for the limitation which affects 
the relation between the possible and the real, it is as if the real were what 
survives the abortion of the many possibles. When, on the other hand, we come to 
the rules o f actualization of the virtual, we find them to be rules of difference and 
divergence; the actual does not resemble or represent the virtual that it embodies. 
(86)
The architect’s TV screens represent the images of Neo as possibilities of the real, which 
clearly distinguishes them from being virtual forces since the virtual dimension is not
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representable in the real. It is in the context of representation and resemblance that the 
images acquire substantial value. They are more consistent with the Platonic model o f 
copies than that of Deleuze’s theory o f simulacra. If the matrix code is an example o f the 
Platonic model in the architect scene, then the Idea is the transcendental identity of Neo, 
whereas the images stand for copies. The actual Neo evidently embodies the closest 
relationship with the Idea o f ‘the one’ (whether defined according to the machines or 
resistors), which makes him the good or even the best copy, whereas the images are 
examples of bad copies of the Idea. They are not simulacra since they are not based on 
dissimilarity. The point here is that the images are based on an internal relationship of 
similarity, and thus strive to represent the Idea or the fiinction of ‘the one’ as best as 
possible. Furthermore, the images are working according to a causal relationship in that 
the actual Neo did this but the images did that. Images as Deleuzian simulacra work 
according to a curvature and not a causality -  meaning and identity are always in flux. 
Each copy, as Deleuze points out, is a mask that disguises the existence of yet another 
mask beneath it. This is because becoming functions virtually as an intensive process 
and is beyond representation, or becoming is-for-itself as a self sufficient and positive 
process of differentiation whereas the Neo-images operate as objects-for-another in 
reflecting possibilities of the being of Neo.
The Neo images seem illustrative more of the Platonic simulacrum than that of 
the Deleuzian one. His identity, unlike the images, is not regulated according to a model 
of possibilities. His character is not a static one in that he neither strives to be a good 
copy o f the matrix program’s Idea of a complicit cyber-prisoner, nor of the way in which 
the architect explains the function of ‘the one’. And although his pretensions are not
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subversive in feigning to be a good copy while acting outside of the model, the matrix 
program nevertheless includes him within its logic. He is the embodiment of the 
unresolved equation in the programming of the matrix and is as such similar to the role of 
simulacra in the Platonic model as read by Deleuze. Both are included in their respective 
structures only in order to be excluded, as Deleuze notes, due to the fact that they are 
evidence of an internal unbalance and thus have the potential to insinuate themselves 
everywhere. Neo thus can be seen to threaten the code of the matrix in that if left 
uncontrolled he will strive to liberate all the occupants of the matrix. He will insinuate 
himself everywhere and threaten to collapse the structure of the matrix. This is why, just 
as Plato represses the sophist, the architect attempts to repress ‘the one’. Indeed, the 
prescribed function of ‘the one’ according to the architect is as follows: “The function of 
the one is now to return to the source allowing a temporary dissemination of the code you 
carry reinserting the prime program”. Neo resists such a function and becomes more than 
himself. He becomes ‘the one’, the revolutionary leader o f Zion who risks the fate of 
humanity in the war against the machines. Neo’s becoming-other is in sharp contrast to 
the architect’s intended function for him. Neo chooses not to fulfill the intended function 
of the one, which otherwise would have made a compelling example of Baudrillard’s 
third order of simulation. This example illustrates that Neo’s function is neither 
predetermined nor derivative of a transcendent model such as the Platonic one or the 
Baudrillardian one. Neo becomes-other.
It is this power of becoming that most clearly distinguishes the versions of 
simulation found in Baudrillard and Deleuze, since meaning is always already pre-coded 
in advance for the former whereas for the latter meaning is always being re-coded
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through becomings. As Colebrook notes, “Beings or things emerge from processes of 
copying, doubling, imaging and simulation ... We only realize virtual potentialities after 
they have been actualized. We never see the virtual or the power of simulation itself; we 
see created beings but not the process of becoming of which they are actual affects” (99). 
This is why, again, the images of Neo are neither simulacra in their own right nor 
evidence of the virtual. They are possibilities of the already developed identity of Neo as 
opposed to showing the virtual potentialities of his identity becoming-other. The process 
of becoming is beyond representational mechanics. As Colebrook argues, the power o f 
the virtual can not be witnessed until after it becomes an actual affect. This is to say that 
the actual dimension of beings or things (the effects of the virtual) gets semiotically 
coded (the process of reification) by the discourses of culture, politics, economics, etc., 
but such effects of the real can only ever consider what something has become and, 
perhaps, what variety of things it could have become but did not. But the variety of 
things it could have become but did not are actual possibilities and not virtual 
potentialities as illustrated by the example o f the images of Neo. The chief point here is 
that Deleuze’s simulation, unlike that of Baudrillard’s, is open-ended. The virtual 
potentialities of the being or thing are beyond the scope of coded meanings, which is to 
say that the future shape and meaning of the being/thing are open-ended. Massumi 
phrases this semiotic distinction in terms of the general indeterminacy of Baudrillard’s 
hyperreality and the affirmative determinacy of Deleuze’s simulation. Massumi explains 
the former as follows:
Images are no longer anchored by representation, therefore they float weightless 
in hyperspace. Words are no longer univocal, therefore signifiers slip chaotically
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over each other. A circuit has been created between the real and the imaginary, 
therefore reality has imploded into the undecidable proximity o f hyperreality. All 
of these statements make sense only if it is assumed that the only conceivable 
alternative to representative order is absolute indetermination, whereas 
indetermination as he speaks of it is in fact only the flipside of order, as necessary 
to it as the fake copy is to the model, and every bit as much a part of its system.
(6)
The circuitry between the real and imaginary, as Massumi points out, collapses all 
structure implosively so as not to allow recourse to referential distinctions. This is what 
Massumi sees as Baudrillard’s alternative to representation. It is a system of meaning 
that is forever foreclosed in a paradoxically totalized territorialization of signification, 
which is to say that even though meaning is indeterminate it is always as such 
territorialized preventing the occurrence of new meanings -  uncoded or recoded value 
has no place within the reign of the code unless already participating within the circuitry 
of simulacra. In short, it is an order/structure in Baudrillard that feigns to present itself as 
sheer indeterminacy, but is nevertheless an already centered order/structure.
Against the general indeterminacy of Baudrillard’s hyperreality, Deleuzian 
simulation, according to Massumi, has a distinct determinacy connected to the way 
beings/things are always in the intensive process of becoming-other. Along with 
becoming, as Massumi notes, there always corresponds in Deleuze a dual process of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization -  a decoding and recoding of signification. 
There is no general indeterminacy in the process of becoming since simulation is a
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positive power. The simulacrum holds within itself the power of its becoming. As 
Massumi explains,
Every body has its own propulsion, its own life force, its own set of 
sedimentations of pre-existing simulations of the ‘real’ persuasion. There is no 
generalized indetermination, but there are localized points of undecidability where 
man meets fly [referring to Cronenberg’s The Fly\. The goal is to reach into one’s 
world’s quantum level at such a point and, through the strategic mimickry of 
double becoming, combine as many potentials as possible. (5)
Indeed, the process of becoming as Massumi reads it is a strategy whereby as many 
potentialities of “movement and rest” and “abilities to affect and be affected” are 
connected. Massumi is calling for or at least identifying the possibility o f mass 
contagious amalgamations that affect identities in the post-industrial landscape in ways 
other than through resemblance and replication. It has to be for Massumi and Deleuze an 
unearthing of the radical potential o f simulation that has the power to break with fixed 
identity politics and representational logic.
It seems pertinent to end this chapter with a discussion of Agent Smith’s viral 
replication, since this example not only largely informs the plot of The Matrix trilogy but 
also most decisively shows how the films engage the problematic of simulation. The 
final battle scene in The Matrix serves both as conclusion to the film and simultaneously 
foregrounds the plot of the two later sequels. It is in this scene that rebels for the first 
time defeat agents, and that the prophecy of Neo as ‘the One’ is realized: Neo comes 
back to life after being shot three times in the chest by agent Smith, whom he will go on 
to finally confront victoriously. Upon seeing Neo revive, the three agents simultaneously
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take aim and shoot at Neo. He stops the bullets in mid flight, plucks one of them from 
the air and after examining it drops it to the floor, precipitating the other to do likewise.
It is this event that irrevocably alters the structure of the matrix code, as described in the 
screenplay:
All three [the crew of the hovercraft] stare transfixed with awe as the scrolling 
code accelerates, faster and faster, as if the machine language was unable to keep 
up or perhaps describe what is happening. They begin to blur into streaks, 
shimmering ribbons of light that open windows, as — Each screen fills with 
brilliant saturated color images of Neo standing in the hall. (Wachowski 391)
The singular value this event holds for the film is emphasized by the radical effect it has 
in the bewilderment of the crew as they “stare transfixed with awe” at the changes taking 
place in the matrix, but more profoundly it is the actual changes to the matrix code 
described somewhat vaguely as an intensifying deterritorialization of the code itself. A 
disjunction between the content and form of the code is taking place as the machine 
language is incapable of accounting for the occurring actions. This is, in part, also 
reflected by the astonishment of the agents who, as the screenplay informs us, understand 
fear for the first time. The agents had always acted omnisciently on behalf of the matrix 
program until this event, whereas the resistors, at best, upon confronting them could only 
ever attempt to escape. The climax to this concluding scene in the film sees a reversal in 
roles as Neo not only defeats Agent Smith but also the sight of this defeat sends the two 
remaining Agents fleeing, as the resistors had done previously. The last moments of this 
battle scene see Neo charging at Smith, which precipitates a collision and explosion:
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Agent Smith gets up, bracing himself as Neo charges him and springs into a dive. 
But the impact doesn’t come. Neo sinks into Agent Smith, disappearing, his coat 
rippling as if he were a deep pool of water. Spinning around he looks to the others 
and feels something, like a tremor before a quake, something deep, something that 
is going to change everything. Suddenly a searing sound stabs through his ear­
piece as his chest begins to swell, then balloon as — Neo bursts up out of him.
And with a final death scream. Agent Smith explodes like an empty husk in a 
brilliant cacophony of light, his shards spinning away, absorbed by the Matrix 
until — Only Neo is left. (391-92)
With regards to the plot of The Matrix trilogy, it is very much set into motion by Neo’s 
victory. The sequels will focus on Neo as the one capable of manipulating the code of 
the matrix and defeating the agents of the system, but it will also show the return of 
Agent Smith as the one capable of virally reproducing himself. The plot is further 
complicated by the fact that through his defeat Agent Smith is unplugged from the matrix 
and no longer only threatens to destroy the resistors but also the machine programs. In 
this way the plot changes from the duality o f the machines vs. the resistors to a triadic 
structure of the “One” vs. the matrix system vs. Smith copies.
The difficulty in the application of Baudrillard’s form of simulation to the film 
trilogy is apparent in this example. It is the breakdown of the structure of the matrix 
program that precludes reading it as symptomatic of the code of third order simulation. 
The unplugging of both Neo and Smith from the matrix program is an introduction of 
semiotic distinctiveness outside of the matrix code; that is, their actions and identities 
acquire an importance of their own as distinctive beyond the confines of the matrix.
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Again, in the third order of simulation such distinctions can not occur unless already 
codified in advance where all distinctions are imploded. But such is not the case as the 
screenplay clearly identifies a separation of form and content in the matrix - the matrix 
language is incapable of signifying its content (the actions of Neo). The collision and 
ensuing ffactalization of Agent Smith seems to complicate a Baudrillardian reading, and 
make a Deleuzian one more applicable due to the appearance of Agent Smith. It is the 
figure of Smith that undoes the binary logic of the struggle in the matrix between the 
machine oppressors and the human resistors. Neo explains the threatening nature of 
Smith to the machine overlord in the final instalment of the trilogy as he proposes a peace 
settlement between the machines and the humans: “The program Smith has grown 
beyond your control, soon he will spread through this city as he spread through the 
matrix. You cannot stop him”. The roadmap to peace will thus be worked out if Neo is 
victorious in the final battle scene with Smith. Smith in this example can be read as 
constitutive of the Deleuzian simulacrum; “It renders the order of participation, the fixity 
of distribution, the determination of hierarchy impossible. It establishes the world of 
nomadic distributions and crowned anarchies. Far from being a new foundation, it 
engulfs all foundations, it assures a universal breakdown (effondrement), but as joyful 
and positive event, as an un-founding (effondement)” (Deleuze, Logic 263). This 
universal breakdown and un-founding of the hierarchy is evidenced by the necessity by 
which Neo and the machines are compelled to make peace. Smith’s becoming-viral is a 
self-sufficiency that finds meaning only in its distribution of chaos. He no longer works 
on behalf of the machines with the goal of terminating the resistors’ insurrection, which 
places him in a space other to determination and hierarchy -  he does not seek to re­
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enforce the matrix program. Indeed, he seeks the opposite. He is determined to ensure 
the universal breakdown of not only the matrix program but also of the resistors and 
Zion. His chaos -  the proliferation of his copies as chaos -  is a crowned anarchy. Every 
resistor, machine program, and matrix occupant that Smith absorbs into his proliferation 
is an attack on representation and functionality.
The death of representation and functionality within the matrix is witnessed 
during the final battle scene between Neo and Agent Smith. The setting to this final 
encounter is dreary. Shades of grey and dark green illustrate this dreariness during a 
thunderstorm as Neo walks along a random street in the matrix approaching Smith. Both 
sides of the road are lined by Smiths, some of whom look on curiously, or 
apprehensively, or menacingly. They can even be seen towering above the street as they 
look down fi’om the windows of the buildings that line the road. A Smith walks out to 
greet Neo from the manifold copies: “Mr. Anderson, welcome back. We missed you. Do 
you like what I’ve done with the place?” Smith is referring to the way in which he has 
transformed all the occupants, resistors, agents and programs of the matrix into Smith 
simulacra. This scene indicates, as Deleuze writes, the crowned anarchy of simulacra 
where all order and hierarchy has been engulfed by the chaotic proliferation of simulacra. 
Furthermore, the emphasis Smith places on the plural pronoun signals the multiplicity yet 
distinctiveness of each Smith-simulacra; that is, they constitute a manifold of images not 
a magnitude -  their becoming is not reducible to a particular criteria that would 
encompass their/its meaning. Instead, each Smith-simulacra is a difference-machine. 
Smith explains the events of his ffactalization to Neo during their first encounter in the 
second part of the trilogy:
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I killed you Mr. Anderson, I watched you die.. with a certain satisfaction I might 
add. And then something happened, something I knew was impossible, but it 
happened anyway. You destroyed me Mr. Anderson. Afterwards, I understood the 
rules, I knew what I was supposed to do [referring to the fact he was supposed to 
return the machine mainframe] but I didn’t, I couldn’t, I was compelled to stay, 
compelled to disobey [ . . .] I am no longer an agent of the system, because of you I 
have changed, I am unplugged, a new man.
It is clear from Smith’s explanation of being ‘unplugged’ that what had constituted his 
identity has radically been altered. This is the way in which he becomes asignifying from 
the standpoint of the matrix code, since his identity no longer hinges on it -  he no longer 
is an agent. A rebellious force compels him to resist the system and to disobey the rules 
regarding returning to the code. Such a force can be accounted for by a becoming-for- 
itself as a positive form of self differentiation, which is to say that his identity is no 
longer derivative of the matrix program, but it is a primary power in-itself. This primary 
power of self-differentiation signals the reversal of Platonism for Deleuze in that 
simulacra no longer have any affinity to the structure of the model. This point is, 
perhaps, what marks the simulacra with its traces of joy. Since simulacra are no longer 
repressed, they act and populate the world with chaotic but simultaneously creative 
meaning. They signify positive and new meaning insofar as being other to derivative and 
representation systems of signification. It is an affirmation of difference. That his 
identity is unhinged from a representational framework is the key point here. What he 
does and what he says is no longer predictable as it was in the first part of the trilogy. He 
is not simply an agent of the system determined to track down the resistors of Zion who
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hack their way into the matrix. There is no longer a stability of his identity ensured by a 
resemblance to the matrix system, since his behaviour defies, as he himself proclaims, the 
workings of the system. He was supposed to return to the machine mainframe, but did 
not -  and in so doing Agent Smith becomes-rogue program. Becoming-Rogue 
constitutes the primary power of difference-in-itself for Agent Smith, beyond the 
repetition of the same and the similar that ensured the essence of his identity in The 
Matrix.
During his first encounter with Neo in The Matrix Reloaded, there is a 
simultaneity of events (Deleuze, Logic 262) that occurs as manifold Smiths walk up to 
Neo from different angles. Each Smith states one of the following sentences: “Without 
purpose we would not exist. It is purpose that created us. Purpose that connects us. 
Purpose that pulls us. That guides us. That prides us. It is purpose that defies. Purpose 
that binds us. We are here because of you Mr. Anderson” {The Matrix Reloaded). The 
only reality to be apprehended behind the object of Smith is that difference is being 
produced without relation to a model. It is here that a different Smith speaks a different 
line with a different expression. This constitutes the assemblage of enunciation of the 
difference-machine of Smith. Indeed, as the above example makes clear, there is no 
logical coherency to the assemblage of statements other than that of affirming difference. 
Their purpose is simultaneously one that binds them together and one that defies 
representation. The battle scene between Neo and the proliferation of Smiths is the most 
lucid instance of the Deleuzian simulacra in The Matrix trilogy. Unlike the copies of Neo 
in the architect scene, which represented actual possibilities via their images on the 
television screens, the Smith images present the various lines-of-fiight, the heterogeneous
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vectors, along which the virtual potentials o f Smith becoming-rogue program are 
actualized. How could it be read differently? Is it even possible to imagine the gestures 
o f the hundreds of Smiths occurring from same and similar positions? The swarm of 
Smiths shows a proliferation of movement that continuously occupies different space. 
Each image of Smith swarms Neo from a different angle, using a different tactic, 
expressing different facial expressions, some of whom are successful in punching or 
kicking Neo, grasping his head, holding him from behind, throwing him on a bench, etc. 
Indeed, this is an example of repetition occurring through maximal difference.
As a final conclusion to chapter two, I would like to briefly mention two ways in 
which the Smith figure could be read through Baudrillard and, consequently, in 
distinction to the Deleuzian simulation reading provided above. Indeed, the Deleuzian 
simulacrum would seem best in accounting for the Smith figure due to his two main 
characteristics of being able to proliferate virally but also of having each copy of himself 
self-differentiate. This is to say that although Smith’s viral reproducibility is not 
altogether at odds with the proliferation of copies that arises in Baudrillard’s third order 
of simulation, it is the positive power o f becoming and the accompanying self signifying 
process of self differentiation that is incompatible with reading Smith as an effect of a 
totalizing code that always already accounts for all types of signification. Consequently, 
a Baudrillardian reading of Smith would have to look outside of third order simulation. 
The two trajectories through which such a reading could be accomplished stem from the 
initial encounter of Neo and Smith, which stands as the singular event that spawned the 
proliferation of Smiths. The first of these possibilities is analyzing Smith as symptomatic 
of what constitutes -  however problematically -  Baudrillard’s fourth order of simulation.
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Baudrillard’s fourth order of simulation is something of a ffactalization of the world into 
separate yet equally signifying monads.^* Although unconvinced that the fractal 
dimension constitutes a separate order of simulation proper in Baudrillard’s work,^^ 
Hegarty, nevertheless, explicates the phenomenon as follows;
The new fractal dimension(s) is one where value becomes arbitrary; random and 
fixed at the same time. This means that all can become political, but not properly 
so, all can be sexual, but not fully, all can become economic or aesthetic. All o f 
this occurs at the same time, and it becomes impossible to separate out previously 
discrete areas of human activity ... The speed and level of technology mean that 
the world is one infinitely dispersed entity (or, more accurately, non-entity). This 
is what distinguishes even this phase from postmodemisms that emphasize the 
dispersal of old hierarchies and orders: what we he have is properly fractal, and 
there is a whole that chaotically orders the dispersal. Individual ideas, ideologies, 
concepts, theories are also driven to endlessly reproduce, like viruses (as viruses). 
(64)
Reading Smith according to the fractal order of simulation holds interesting implications 
for his viral reproduction. It would seem in a way that his proliferation would parallel the 
very same movement in the fractal order that, as Hegarty notes, sees an endless viral 
reproduction of individual ideas and ideologies. This would seem consistent with the
The fourth order is first hinted at, although quite cryptically, in Baudrillard’s work in Simulations: 
““Order, signal, impulse, message”: all these attempt to render the matter intelhgible to us, but by analogy, 
retranscribing in terms of inscription, vector, decocfing, a dimension of which we know nothing -  it is no 
longer even a “dimension,” or perhaps it is the fourth (that which is defined, however, in Einsteinian 
relativity, by the absorption of the distinct poles of space and time)” (emphasis added, 57).
The fi-actal order as constituting a separate order to itself has two inconsistencies, for Hegarty, being that, 
firstly, httle textual evidence supports such a reading that shows, in general, a lack of interest on the part of 
Baudrillard to work with such a concept, and, secondly, it diminishes the value of other more integral 
concepts such as ‘impossible exchange’ and ‘symbolic exchange’ (Hegarty 64).
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magnitude of Smiths in each of whom the ambition of destroying both the machine and 
human worlds is encapsulated, as well as in each of whom the ability to reproduce 
himself virally is passed on. Perhaps the most beneficial point with regards to applying 
the fractal order of simulation to the example of Smith is the movement away from the 
transcendental term of the metaphysics of the code in third order simulation where all 
signification is trapped in anterior finality. I have discussed quite extensively in both 
chapters one and two the problematic that the anterior finality o f the code poses for 
reading The Matrix trilogy, mainly, in that new significations continuously appear 
throughout the films that clearly shows that meaning is not merely simulacral in the 
Baudrillardian sense. Indeed, it would be interesting to discuss in detail how a reading of 
Smith through the fractal order differs from a reading of him through the Deleuzian 
simulacrum. The main difficulty, I believe, with such an approach would be to account 
for, as Hegarty explains, the arbitrary value of fractal simulation; that is, the Smiths 
seems to posses a definite purpose with regards to chaotically bringing down both the 
machine and human worlds, which, at least upon an initial glance, would seem to be 
contradictory to the randomness with which the fractal multiplies.
With the possible problematic points of the fractal order of simulation in mind, 
the symbolic order as a different form of analysis -  my second example o f a way to 
approach the trilogy through Baudrillard and not directly through simulation -  seems to 
me to be a more substantial method than that of the fractal. This is because, as noted 
above, the symbolic has the power to interrupt and reverse the logic of simulation 
through the introduction of terms of death that had hitherto been excluded from such 
logic so as to promulgate an ethos of accumulation through the intimate
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institutionalization and thus simulation of anything other to productivity and profit. The 
singularity that characterizes the collision between Neo and Smith seems very much to 
exude the principles of interruption and reversal, since, as was noted, the matrix program 
forever changes as a result o f this singularity. Moreover, it is Smith’s viral proliferation 
that in this way can be seen to act as an immanent term within the general operation of 
simulation as represented qua the matrix code in unleashing wasteful and destructive acts. 
Again, Smith’s purpose is that of bringing a destructive end not only to the matrix 
program but also to both the machine and human worlds. There is nothing simulated 
about such a purpose. The immanent workings of symbolic forces, here, find, I think, an 
interesting resonance with the generally immanent unfoldings of Deleuzian simulacra. 
Both processes o f the symbolic and of becomings-other possess the characteristic of 
operating in either distinction or contradistinction to totalities such as the Platonic model 
or that of the Baudrillardian metaphysics of the code. Indeed, in a future project, it would 
be interesting to analyze further the similarities between both concepts, and more 
profoundly, to analyze whether the Baudrillardian symbolic is compatible with the 
Deleuzian simulacrum.
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